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*Case Studies in U.S. IMET Training
and Its Role in Internal Defense
and Development*

Jennifer Morrison Taw

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Thailand and the Philippines

Case Studies in U.S. IMET Training and Its Role in Internal Defense and Development

Jennifer Morrison Taw

*Prepared for the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy*

National Defense Research Institute

Preface

This monograph was prepared as part of a three-phase project entitled "The Effectiveness of U.S. Military Training Activities in Promoting Internal Defense and Development in the Third World." The purpose of this project is to assess the effectiveness of programs to train U.S. and foreign military personnel in foreign internal defense (FID) and internal defense and development (IDAD), respectively, to examine the benefits that the United States derives from these programs, and to consider how future efforts can be improved and strengthened.

The results of the first phase of the project were published as a Note: Taw, Jennifer Morrison, and William H. McCoy, *International Military Student Training: Beyond Tactics*, N-3634-USDP, 1993. It surveys current U.S. international military student (IMS) training in internal defense and development as well as the training of the U.S. military in FID and related areas. The Note also examines the broader social, political, and military issues related to U.S. FID/IDAD training and makes preliminary recommendations regarding U.S. FID/IDAD training.

This monograph is one of three presenting the results of six comparative case studies prepared for the second phase of the project, in which the effectiveness of U.S. military training of international military students is examined. These regional case studies examine whether U.S. training provided to foreign military students promotes human rights, professionalism, democratic values, national development, and appropriate civil-military relations, as well as meeting the general goals of the international military education and training (IMET) program. This monograph focuses on Thailand and the Philippines.

The project's final phase will provide general recommendations for improving the organization, dispensation, doctrine, and focus of future U.S. FID/IDAD training efforts, and specific recommendations for the key countries identified in the case studies.

The research presented here was conducted for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. It was carried out within the International Security and Defense Strategy program of RAND's National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.

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Summary

U.S. security assistance, particularly military training activities, is considered an extremely economical means of achieving a broad spectrum of U.S. military and foreign policy goals in the developing world. Most military training activities are funded either through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program or through the international military education and training (IMET) program. FMS training usually accompanies and supports defense materiel sales. IMET training, on the other hand, is intended to complement FMS training by promoting professionalism, improved leadership and management capabilities, and non-system-specific technical skills.

The IMET program's annual budget is relatively low, yet the program is generally considered cost-effective. Each year the United States trains thousands of international military students, usually in courses that both the United States and the students' home countries agree are appropriate to the countries' defense needs. The effects of such training are then multiplied when students trained in the United States return to their home countries and act as instructors, replicating the courses they took in the United States using U.S. training materials and doctrine. Finally, military students selected for training in the United States often subsequently attain leadership positions in their countries' militaries or civilian governments and are frequently more accessible to the United States—and amenable to U.S. interests—than are their counterparts.

Internal Defense and Development Versus Democratization

IMET training may be used in support of foreign countries' internal defense and development (IDAD) strategies, which encompass the "full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."¹ IDAD is each country's own responsibility. For example, the United States may provide foreign internal defense (FID)² to a host

¹*Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, Field Manual 100-20/AFP 3-20, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, December 1990, Glossary-5.

²*Foreign internal defense (FID)* is defined as "participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency," *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and*

nation, but it will not provide IDAD. This distinction between FID and IDAD becomes blurred, however, vis-à-vis training. The United States may provide training in support of foreign nations' IDAD efforts, either deliberately or incidentally.³

IDAD has two complementary components: internal defense (which can include counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, riot-control, or other internal defense missions) and internal development (nation-building). The United States has trained foreign militaries in skills relevant to each. However, controversy surrounds the training: Detractors argue that both internal defense and internal development are civilian, not military, responsibilities, and that U.S. training in IDAD skills weakens militaries' respect for civilian authority.

Members of the United States Congress, concerned about precisely these issues, advocate limiting IDAD training, promoting instead training in the skills and concepts required for eventual democratization, including

- civil-military relations,
- human rights,⁴
- defense resource management, and
- military justice.⁵

Congress therefore passed the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L.101-513) in FY 1991, mandating that not less than \$1 million of IMET funds shall be set aside for

developing, initiating, conducting and evaluating courses and other programs for training foreign civilian and military officials in managing and administering foreign military establishments and budgets, and for training foreign military and civilian officials in creating and maintaining effective military judicial systems and military codes of conduct, including observance of internationally recognized human rights . . . [civilian personnel] shall include foreign government personnel of ministries other than ministries of defense if the military education and training would (i) contribute to responsible defense resource management, (ii) foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the

Associated Terms, JCS Publication 1-02, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1989, p. 150.

³Many of the skills militaries are trained in for conventional warfare are relevant to IDAD, including engineering, medical, communications, transportation, and constabulary skills.

⁴In 1978, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act to incorporate a human-rights clause in the statement of IMET objectives. Chapter 5, Section 543 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by the International Security Assistance Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 2347b).

⁵U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, 102d Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 137, No. 77, 21 May 1991, p. S6258, and Vol. 137, No. 9, Part II, 14 January 1991, p. S848.

military, or (iii) improve military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights.

The Defense Security Assistance Agency is the lead agent in developing and assigning appropriate courses for this expanded IMET (IMET-E) program, and security assistance officers in host nations are responsible for promoting foreign military and civilian attendance.⁶ The basic assumption underlying IMET-E is that training foreign civilian and military personnel in issues related to civil-military relations can help promote the consolidation of democracy in host nations.⁷ At the very least, IMET-E provides an opportunity to familiarize future foreign military and civilian leaders with U.S. political values and practical means by which to operationalize such values.

Thailand

Although the Thai military has become heavily involved in IDAD since the mid-1970s, U.S. training has played little, if any, role in such endeavors. Indeed, by mutual agreement with the Thais, U.S. training has been predominantly conventional since the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1975-1976. The Thai military's involvement in nation-building, moreover, although nominally undertaken in the name of democratization, appears to serve the selfish interests of the military and individual military officers as much as the broader goal of internal development. Ongoing projects will be cancelled and new, higher profile projects begun as senior officers rotate through and seek to aggrandize their own contributions to rural development.⁸ U.S. IDAD training under such circumstances could only have further promoted the military's usurpation of civilian responsibilities and power.

Training in the tenets of democracy, civil-military relations, military justice, and defense resource management,⁹ on the other hand, would be helpful to both civilian and military personnel in Thailand. Thailand clearly fits Samuel

⁶The act's emphasis on training civilians is also new and is intended to familiarize foreign civilian officials with their militaries' functions and budgets, thereby further helping to promote foreign militaries' subordination to civilian control.

⁷The role of IMET in democratization has been a subject of congressional concern. See, for example, *Congressional Record*, 14 January 1991, p. S850.

⁸Interviews with Dr. Suchit Bunbongkorn, Dean of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, and with a U.S. Army officer, Bangkok, June 1992; it must be cautioned that in the limited time available to her, the author did not have access to all possible sources. In some instances, therefore, other existing points of view may not be represented.

⁹Despite the May 1992 riots, the U.S. government considers the Thai military's human-rights record to be acceptable. Interview with U.S. Assistant Army Attaché to the U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, June 1992.

Huntington's "cyclical model of despotism and democracy."¹⁰ If the changes under former-Prime Minister Anand, which began to bring the military under civilian control, are to be continued and successful, the military must not only accept limitations on its role and acquiesce to civilian control, but the civilian government must inspire confidence and trust.

In the past, Thai civilian governments have been so corrupt that the public has simply accepted the military stepping in to "clean things up."¹¹ One foreign bureaucrat visiting Thailand remarked that "democratic government and clean government are presented as alternatives rather than complements."¹² Thai political scientist Kramol Thongthammachart wrote that Thai political parties have always been overshadowed by military intervention in government because they themselves have little understanding of the democratic system.¹³

Yet Thailand is now being run by a prime minister who is considered honest, and the military's control over government and private enterprise is being challenged. These are precisely the types of changes that IMET-E is intended to support. Some senior Thai commanders have expressed interest in such training and could clearly benefit from greater exposure to the skills and concepts required for increased democratization and improved civil-military relations. The fledgling IMET-E program in Thailand requires further development but finds itself in a fertile environment. The issue of IMET-E funding will have to be addressed, however: At this point, selection of such courses involves sacrificing some of the more conventional courses the Thais have traditionally chosen. At a time when the overall number of Thais trained in the United States is declining, this could be a serious problem.¹⁴ If host nations are required to spend a portion

¹⁰Samuel Huntington, in "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 99, No. 2, Summer 1984, p. 210, describes this form of democratic "development" as the "cyclical model of alternating despotism and democracy. . . . In this case, key elites normally accept, at least superficially, the legitimacy of democratic forms. Elections are held from time to time, but rarely is there any sustained succession of governments coming to power through the electoral process. Governments are as often the product of military interventions as they are of elections. Once a military junta takes over, it will normally promise to return power to civilian rule. In due course, it does so. . . . In a praetorian situation like this, neither authoritarian nor democratic institutions are effectively institutionalized."

¹¹Indeed, this is a potential problem with U.S. pressure on foreign militaries to accede to civilian authority. In Thailand and the Philippines, as in many other countries, the civilian leaders have proven to be as corrupt as the military—if not more so.

¹²Cited in Wallace, Charles P., "Graft and Gunplay Herald Thai Election," *Los Angeles Times*, 17 March 1986.

¹³Cited in Handley, Paul, "Open to Offers," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 February 1992, pp. 16-17.

¹⁴This issue will not be easily resolved, however. Funding for IMET has always been very limited, in part because of congressional reluctance to deal with Third World militaries, many of which are indeed guilty of human-rights violations, corruption, and authoritarian politics. Nonetheless, as is discussed in the Conclusion, for improving and maintaining foreign relations, funding for IMET is money well spent. IMET allows the United States to generate relationships with

of their IMET funds on IMET-E courses, it will suggest that the United States is more interested in exposing host-nation civilian and military personnel to U.S. values and ideals than in training them in military skills and developing close and cooperative military-to-military relationships. This makes IMET-E a price to pay for host nations, rather than an opportunity, and could breed bad blood between them and the United States.

Philippines

Although internal defense and development are important missions for the Philippine military, the United States does not train many Filipinos in these areas. On the one hand, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has developed its own counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy, and therefore requires little internal defense training from the United States; on the other hand, although the United States provided substantial financial support as well as equipment for rural development activities prior to the forced withdrawal of its bases, actual training in civic action is mostly limited to joint-combined exercises. The Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) Philippines, nonetheless, includes nation-building as one of the goals supported by U.S. training.

It is clear that both the Philippine government and military could benefit from exposure to the theoretical issues IMET-E is intended to address. Democracy remains tenuous in the Philippines in the aftermath of Marcos' "presidency": The government is still riddled with corruption, and democratic institutions continue to be misused. Moreover, the Philippine military has lost its traditional respect for civilian authority, continues to perpetrate brutal human-rights abuses, and has failed to stamp out the two insurgencies that have plagued the country for more than 20 years. Finally, the Philippines' internal and external defense efforts are threatened by the country's persistent lack of financial resources.

Yet, although the JUSMAG Philippines is successfully promoting IMET-E to the AFP, which has expressed interest in such courses, the AFP has indicated that it will not feel free to select IMET-E courses as long as they must be financed out of the general IMET funds. Technical and tactical training will continue to take precedence over such courses, especially given the decline in IMET funds in 1993,

future leaders—a long-term benefit that a rich collection of anecdotes suggests is quite useful in terms of influence and leverage. Indeed, in an interview (Bangkok, June 1992), the chief of training at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group, Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI), warned that U.S. relations with Thailand in 20 years will suffer from the suspension of training between 1990 and 1992, as well as from the decrease in training as of 1993.

the Philippines' new need for external defense capabilities, and the ongoing counterinsurgency efforts. Like Thailand, the Philippines provides a fertile environment for IMET-E but cannot afford to sacrifice more traditional courses for such training. And, as in Thailand, for the United States to require the Philippines to use some of its limited IMET funds for IMET-E can only be expected to breed resentment, thus undermining one of the fundamental goals of the IMET program: cooperative and mutually beneficial military-to-military and government-to-government relations.

Conclusion

Although IMET training is a very small program with a very small budget, it has an impact beyond its size. Not easily quantified in dollars and cents, the success of IMET lies in the prestige and quality of U.S. training that motivates foreign countries to send their best and their brightest military students for courses in the United States. The United States has the opportunity to expose friendly and allied nations' future leaders to the U.S. system and culture, thus generating mutual understanding and durable working relationships. Such exposure may not translate into direct influence—in neither the Philippines nor Thailand could it be said that the military in general behaves consistently with U.S. ideals, despite U.S.-trained leaders—but at the very least it provides a common language for negotiations (literally and figuratively).

That said, IMET training nonetheless has obvious limitations. It helps develop military-to-military relationships but does not guarantee U.S. influence. It can expose foreign military students to U.S. culture, ideals, and values, but it cannot guarantee that they will choose to—or be able to—reproduce them in their own countries. It can improve individuals' military skills, but it cannot guarantee that those individuals will use them appropriately. It can provide training materials and experience, but it cannot guarantee that a country will develop an independent training capability.

For example, U.S.-trained military personnel were represented among both the rebel and the loyal troops in the Philippine coup attempts. Despite years of exposure to U.S. democracy, senior U.S.-trained Thai military officers continue to believe that the military must play a central, paternalistic role in democratization. The Philippine military, once strongly influenced by civilian control of the military in the United States, has now changed, despite ongoing IMET training. Exposure to U.S. values and mores has not prevented the Philippine military from perpetrating human-rights abuses. Neither the Philippine nor the Thai armed forces have developed an independent training capability in conventional

tactics or techniques, despite 40 years of U.S. training. U.S. relations with the Thai and Philippine military leaderships are cordial and allow for military cooperation in joint exercises, but such relations do not necessarily translate into political influence.¹⁵

What is true of IMET training in general is equally true of the IDAD training provided under IMET. The United States can train foreign militaries in civic action and related internal development skills, but, as in Thailand, such training can be used to enrich the military and extend its control over traditionally civilian enterprises and responsibilities. Or, as in the Philippines, such training can be lost to the military and the country as military technicians retire for higher paying civilian jobs in foreign countries. Nor is U.S. IDAD training a priority for the Thai and Philippine militaries. Provided with limited IMET funds, both the Philippines and Thailand prefer highly technical and/or advanced U.S. training in mostly conventional skills.

Finally, the expanded IMET program is intended to promote human rights, fair military judiciaries, effective resource management, and civilian control over armed forces. The program is still in its infancy, and even at its peak it cannot promise to wring reforms out of recalcitrant militaries. But it is significant in signaling a new policy in the United States for promoting democratic reforms among IMET recipients. It reflects the U.S. Congress' intention to shift from training foreign militaries in infrastructural development to exposing them to American political values. Whereas, in the past, impetus toward eventual democratization was held to be a by-product of foreign military students' exposure to U.S. culture and values, IMET-E provides actual courses in basic elements of democratic reform. Unfortunately, IMET-E is funded out of general IMET funds. At a time when countries' annual IMET allocations are in many cases being reduced, it is unlikely that countries will select IMET-E courses over more traditional U.S. military training. Yet, if host nations' militaries are required to pay for IMET-E courses out of their general IMET allocations, they can be expected to be frustrated and angry—especially the militaries, as they watch IMET funds going to civilians—and the IMET program itself will be further burdened. Both IMET and IMET-E deserve adequate funding, especially given the relatively few dollars actually required.

¹⁵The benefits and limits of IMET are discussed in Manolas, Spiro C., and Louis J. Samelson, "The United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program: A Report to Congress," *The DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Spring 1990, pp. 4-6.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

| | |
|--------|---|
| AFP | Armed Forces of the Philippines |
| CGSC | Command and General Staff College |
| CMSID | Civil-military strategies for internal development |
| CMT | Citizen Military Training |
| COIN | Counterinsurgency |
| CONUS | Continental United States |
| DIA | Defense Intelligence Agency |
| DSAA | Defense Security Assistance Agency |
| ESF | Economic support funds |
| FID | Foreign internal defense |
| FMS | Foreign Military Sales |
| GAO | General Accounting Office |
| IDAD | Internal defense and development |
| IISS | International Institute for Strategic Studies |
| IMET-E | Expanded IMET |
| IMETP | International military education and training program |
| IMS | International military student |
| IP | Informational Program (U.S. Department of Defense) |
| JAG | Judge Advocate General |
| JUSMAG | Joint United States Military Assistance Group |
| LIC | Low intensity conflict |
| MNLF | Moro National Liberation Front |
| MTT | Mobile training team |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NPA | New Peoples' Army |
| OCONUS | Outside Continental United States |
| OCS | Officers Candidate School |
| OJT | On-the-job training |

| | |
|--------|--|
| PACOM | Pacific Command |
| PC | Philippine Constabulary |
| PMA | Philippine Military Academy |
| PME | Professional military education |
| PNP | Philippine National Police |
| PSYOPS | Psychological Operations |
| RAM | Reform the Armed Forces Movement |
| RIM | Retainable instructional materials |
| RTA | Royal Thai Army |
| RTAF | Royal Thai Air Force |
| RTARF | Royal Thai Armed Forces |
| RTN | Royal Thai Navy |
| SATFA | Security Assistance Training Field Agency |
| SATMO | Security Assistance Training Management Organization |
| SO | Special Operations |
| TRADOC | Training and Doctrine Command |
| YOU | Young Officers' Union |

1. Introduction

We have three broad regional objectives for the future. First, we wish to maintain an overall environment of stability and regional balance in which democracies can flourish and economies can grow. This is best served by presence, positive involvement, security assistance, and by building trust and confidence. Second, we will want to continue to expand bilateral military-to-military relationships throughout the region where such relationships support U.S. security, economic, and political interests. Finally, we should maintain a deterrent posture where circumstances warrant . . . our overall goal is to provide a security umbrella for Asia and the Pacific under which U.S. national interests can be attained, democracies can flourish, free trade and commerce can prosper, and human rights can be preserved. To achieve this goal we seek access and influence in peacetime; we prepare to deter aggression in time of crisis; and, if U.S. interests, citizens, or allies are attacked or threatened, we are ready to respond promptly and decisively.¹

—Admiral Huntington Hardisty, Commander in Chief,
U.S. Pacific Command

U.S. security assistance to developing nations is generally believed to be a cost-effective means of achieving a broad range of American military and political goals in the developing world. Beyond the clear advantage of maintaining military-to-military relationships, American security assistance is assumed to translate into some measure of political influence, as well. Through such influence, the United States can encourage host nations to develop stable, democratic institutions and increased respect for human rights. U.S. military training activities, in particular, are considered an inexpensive and effective means of achieving these military and political goals: They preclude basing large numbers of U.S. forces overseas and introduce international military students directly to concepts and skills that are often relevant to democracy and human rights.

This monograph examines past and present U.S. military training and advisory efforts in Thailand and the Philippines in an attempt to determine the effectiveness of such efforts in promoting the institutional and attitudinal changes required for infrastructural and/or democratic development. Among the issues considered are the character of each country's political and military

¹U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings on Military Construction Appropriations for 1991*, 101st Congress, 2d Session, Part 5, 28 February 1990, pp. 168-169.

institutions; each country's internal defense and development plans; and the nature of U.S. training efforts within each country.

This monograph is divided into six sections. Section 2 identifies issues involved in development and democratization. Sections 3 and 4 examine U.S. military training of Thai and Philippine military students, respectively, and offer preliminary measures of effectiveness. Section 5 compares and contrasts the case studies, then seeks to elucidate the principal difficulties encountered by the United States in trying to reform and influence the host nations' militaries and governments. Section 6 considers the possibility of resolving these difficulties and the potential means of doing so.

2. Promoting Internal Defense and Development

IDAD Versus Democratization: U.S. Training of Foreign Militaries

Internal Defense and Development Training

IDAD—internal defense and development—is a strategy encompassing the “full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”¹ IDAD is each country’s own responsibility. For example, the United States may provide foreign internal defense (FID)² to a host nation, but it will not provide IDAD. This distinction between FID and IDAD becomes blurred, however, vis-à-vis training. The United States may provide training in support of foreign nations’ IDAD efforts, either deliberately or incidentally.³ U.S. goals in providing such training include

- promoting a host nation’s stability by creating effective internal security forces;
- promoting a host nation’s stability by involving the military in infrastructural development, thereby improving the military’s image while providing needed services to the public; and
- fostering U.S.-host-nation government-to-government and military-to-military relations.⁴

¹*Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, Field Manual 100-20/AFP 3-20, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, December 1990, Glossary-5.

²*Foreign internal defense (FID)* is defined as “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.” *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, JCS Publication 1-02, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1989, p. 150.

³Many of the skills militaries are trained in for conventional warfare are relevant to IDAD, including engineering, medical, communications, transportation, and constabulary skills.

⁴This is a general goal of all U.S. military training for foreign armed forces and is not limited to IDAD training.

The Two Components of IDAD Training

Internal Defense. The United States began training foreign militaries in counterinsurgency in the 1950s, when it seemed a necessary means of blocking communist encroachment into the developing world. Although there was also an American effort to train foreign police forces in the 1960s through the U.S. Department of State's Public Safety Program, the program was deemed too politically sensitive and was dissolved in 1973.⁵ The introduction of section 660D to the Foreign Assistance Act in July 1975 prohibited the United States from further training of foreign police forces.⁶ It provided additional justification for the continued training of foreign militaries in internal defense capabilities.⁷

Yet counterinsurgency training was also sensitive, and the United States feared that its policy of supporting counterinsurgencies could be seen in some cases as tacit support for authoritarian governments. Training in nation-building skills was therefore incorporated into training plans to offset the potentially counter-democratic effects of counterinsurgency training.⁸

Internal Development (Nation-Building). In 1962, the Kennedy administration began inserting civic action programs into military assistance plans for host nations, the assumption being that training their militaries to provide public services would enhance host nations' development efforts, thereby leading to stability, economic and infrastructural growth, and, eventually, democratization.⁹

⁵Lefever, Ernest, *U.S. Public Safety Assistance: An Assessment*, The Brookings Institution, 1973; *U.S. Code, Congressional and Administrative News*, P.L. 93-559, 93rd Congress, 2d Session, 1974, pp. 6706-6707.

⁶Powell, John Duncan, "Military Assistance and Militarism in Latin America," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Part 1, June 1965, pp. 390-392, stresses that internal defense is a political, not a military issue, and suggests that the United States provide more training and equipment to constabularies. He argues that if U.S. foreign policy is to foster civilian government, it must direct internal security assistance to civilian, not military, security agencies. His point was supported by events in Argentina, where the internal situation improved markedly when internal security responsibilities were returned to the police, who were better equipped and trained to work with the public and meet its needs. *U.S. Congress, Congressional Record*, 102d Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 137, No. 77, 21 May 1991, pp. S6257-S6258.

⁷The rationale behind the enactment of this legislation and the related debate on aid to foreign police forces is clearly summarized in McHugh, Matthew F., et al., *Police Aid to Central America: Yesterday's Lessons, Today's Choices*, Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, Washington, D.C., August 1986.

⁸In *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, December 1990, pp. 2-7, IDAD is described as "ideally a preemptive strategy against insurgency; however, if an insurgency develops, it is a strategy for counterinsurgency activities. . . . Military actions provide a level of internal security which permits and supports growth through balanced development." In an interview on 26 May 1992, the civilian low intensity conflict (LIC) expert at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, discussed IDAD and counterinsurgency (COIN) interchangeably.

⁹There is an extensive body of academic literature on national development, within which a clear distinction is made between democratic, economic, and infrastructural development. To cite just a few works: Lopez, George A., and Michael Stohl, "Liberalization and Redemocratization in

Foreign militaries, with their rigorous organization and large manpower pools, appeared to be ideally suited to such efforts, which would not only help build infrastructure but would improve the militaries' public images.¹⁰ Such a role for the military seemed natural to the United States, which had made heavy use of its own armed forces—particularly the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—in the nineteenth-century development of the western frontiers.¹¹

Furthermore, the United States has long held to the belief that training foreign militaries in any skills, whether conventional or nonconventional, creates professional militaries that recognize the limits of their role and submit to civilian rule. The combined positive effects of internal development efforts and foreign military professionalization were assumed to outweigh any potential damage to civil-military relations that counterinsurgency training could cause.

Criticism of IDAD Training

Nonetheless, IDAD training has come under fire. Detractors of IDAD submit that both components of IDAD—internal defense and internal development—are civilian, not military, responsibilities, and that training foreign militaries in such skills, far from improving civil-military relations, weakens a military's respect for civilian authority.¹²

Opponents of the nation-building aspect of IDAD argue that training foreign militaries in internal development skills simply gives them the edge in the persistent competition between developing countries' militaries and private

Latin America," *Political Science*, No. 178, 1987, pp. 231–262; Huntington, Samuel, "Will More Countries Be Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 99, No. 2, Summer 1984, pp. 193–218, "How Countries Democratize," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 106, No. 4, 1991–92, pp. 579–616, and *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968; Hoselitz, Bert, and Myron Weiner, "Economic Development and Political Stability," *Dissent*, Spring 1961; Dahl, Robert, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971; Linz, Juan, Larry Diamond, and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*, Vol. 4, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989; Powell, John Duncan, "Military Assistance and Militarism in Latin America," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Part 1, June 1965, p. 382.

¹⁰Bienen, Henry, "Armed Forces and National Modernization," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 1, October 1983, p. 4.

¹¹Willer, Clinton, "Engineer Challenges in Nation Building," *Military Review*, February 1989, p. 32.

¹²The view that IDAD is a civilian responsibility dominates American thinking, where police and civilian government, and/or private enterprise are responsible for internal defense and development, respectively. In other countries, however, the distinction between civilian and military IDAD responsibilities is not nearly as clear. Nor is military involvement in IDAD necessarily related to poor civil-military relations. In Senegal, for example, where the military is involved in infrastructural development, it nonetheless remains subservient to civilian authority.

sectors for profitable domestic contracts.¹³ In both Honduras and Thailand, for example, engineering battalions were reconfigured specifically to compete head to head with private engineering firms.¹⁴ Such undertakings enrich the military at the expense of the private sector, impeding economic development and further centralizing economic power in the hands of the military. Holding both military and economic power, a country's armed forces are unlikely to completely cede political power to any civilian government.¹⁵

A General Accounting Office (GAO) study published in June 1990 cites official U.S. concern regarding the further development of nation-building or IDAD skills in one country's military because of the "tenuous" civil-military relationship in that country.¹⁶ A 1971 RAND study¹⁷ contends that such concern is quite reasonable, stating that

¹³Indeed, nation-building activities have not produced the economic development that was anticipated. Nation-building cannot be successful unless—as is rarely the case—long-standing social, cultural, and political attitudes and infrastructures are amenable to such an effort. See Harrison, Lawrence, *Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985. Harrison cites other social scientists who have addressed this subject: Myrdal, Gunnar, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, New York: Pantheon, 1968; Lewis, W. Arthur W., *The Theory of Economic Growth*, Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955; Weber, Max, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950; Schumpeter, Joseph A., *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 3rd ed., New York: Harper Bros., 1950; McClelland, David C., *The Achieving Society*, Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1961; Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, Boston and Toronto: Little Brown and Co., 1963; Banfield, Edward C., *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958; Rangel, Carlos, *The Latin Americans: Their Love-Hate Relationship with the United States*, New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977.

¹⁴Interview with Cresencio (Chris) Arcos, U.S. Ambassador to Honduras, April 1991; interview with LTC Robert Leicht, Commander, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, Okinawa, Japan, May 1992; Schwarz, Benjamin C., "Peacetime Engagement and the Underdeveloped World: The U.S. Military's 'Nation Assistance' Mission," unpublished paper, p. 24. Schwarz describes the economic power of the militaries of many developing countries, especially Latin American: "The armed forces of Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala have created their own banks . . . engage in large-scale investment in real estate and other business ventures, carry out private construction projects for profit, own farms and resorts, and control lucrative government agencies." In a May 1991 interview with Ambassador Arcos, Schwarz was told that the Honduran military at one point requested American military engineering equipment to expand private, for-profit construction projects.

¹⁵This is the case in Thailand and is increasingly true of the Philippines. For more discussion of this subject, see Schwarz, Benjamin C., "Peacetime Engagement" unpublished paper, pp. 18-39.

¹⁶*Security Assistance: Observations on the International Military Education and Training Program*, GAO Briefing Report to Congressional Requestors, Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office/National Security and International Affairs Division, June 1990, p. 26. There was consensus that the efficacy of training militaries in nation-building had to be determined on a case-by-case basis. U.S. officials appeared to believe such training would be appropriate in Peru and Haiti, for example, although that may no longer be the case, given political developments in those two countries since 1990.

¹⁷Einaudi, Luigi, and Alfred Stepan III, *Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil*, R-0586-DO5, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1971, pp. 1-57; Fitch, John Samuel, "Human Rights and the U.S. Military Training Program: Alternatives for Latin America," *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 4, Fall 1981, p. 77. Fitch also cites the following on this topic (footnote, p. 77): Fitch, John Samuel, *The Military Coup d'Etat as a Political Process: Ecuador 1948-1966*, Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977, pp. 136-145, and 162-164; Stepan, Alfred C., *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 153-187, and "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future*, New Haven,

logic . . . suggests that to the extent that military expertise, or professionalism, is increased in areas of counterinsurgency, nation-building and multi-sector development planning, the military would tend to become more rather than less involved in politics.

Critics also argue that training foreign militaries in internal defense is inappropriate. They stress that internal security is a political, not a military, problem and is better handled by civilian police organizations than by armed forces. In contrast to the military, the police constantly interact with the public. They therefore have the opportunity to build working relationships with the populace, resulting in better human intelligence, among other things. Moreover, in contrast to the military, the police are trained to respond to conflicts with minimum, not maximum, force; such situations are thus resolved with less violence and less long-term acrimony.¹⁸

Finally, numerous studies have indicated that, far from leading to improved civil-military relations, military professionalization leads to greater military involvement in politics as militaries perceive their own skills and abilities to surpass those of the civilian governments.¹⁹

Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973, pp. 47-68; Maullin, Richard, *Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia*, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973, pp. 111-118; Sereseres, Caesar, "The Guatemalan Armed Forces: Military Development and National Politics," paper presented to the Latin American Studies Association Convention, Atlanta, Georgia, March 1976, pp. 32-34; Jenkins, Brian, and Caesar Sereseres, "U.S. Military Assistance and the Guatemalan Armed Forces," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 3, Summer 1977, pp. 575-594; Ronfeldt, David, and Caesar Sereseres, *Arms Transfers, Diplomacy, and Security in Latin America and Beyond*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, P-6005, October 1977, pp. 20-28; O'Donnell, Guillermo, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism*, Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1973, pp. 154-165; Lowenthal, Abraham, "Armies and Politics in Latin America," *World Politics*, 27, October 1974, pp. 129-130; Corbett, Charles, "Politics and Professionalism: The South American Military," in Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies, eds., *The Politics of Anti-Politics: The Military in Latin America*, Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press, 1978, pp. 20-21; Fitch, John Samuel, "The Political Consequences of U.S. Military Assistance to Latin America," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 5, Spring 1979, pp. 380-386.

¹⁸U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, 102d Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 137, No. 77, 21 May 1991, pp. S6257-S6258. Former Senator Alan Cranston compares the effects of military and police approaches with internal defense in Argentina. See also Hoffman, Bruce, Jennifer M. Taw, David Arnold, *Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-3998-A, 1991, pp. 44-46 and 50.

¹⁹As early as 1965, scholars were making this argument. John Duncan Powell argued that "the shift in emphasis from hemispheric security to internal security capabilities [pursued by the Kennedy administration] will make the Latin American military better trained and equipped than ever to intervene in the political systems of their nations." "Military Assistance and Militarism in Latin America," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Part 1, June 1965, p. 388. Powell goes on to demonstrate how unpopular his view was within the U.S. government at the time, on pp. 388-389. See also Fitch, John Samuel, "Human Rights and the U.S. Military Training Program: Alternatives for Latin America," *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 4, Fall 1981, p. 78. For more on the effects of professionalization, see the following: Abrahamson, Bengt, *Military Professionalization and Political Power*, Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972; Finer, Samuel, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962; Bienen, Henry, "Armed Forces and National Modernization," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 1, October 1983, p. 10; Lefever, Ernest W., "Arms Transfers, Military Training, and Domestic Politics," *Arms Transfers in the Modern World*, Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy, eds., New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979, p. 284. Bienen argues that we cannot assume that militaries are the most organized or modernity-oriented societal institutions, nor even that they are most concerned with the preservation of the state. Ernest

Training in Democratic Values and Institutions

Members of the U.S. Congress, concerned about precisely these issues, advocate limiting IDAD training and instead promoting training in the skills and concepts required for democratization, including

- civil-military relations,
- human rights,²⁰
- defense resource management, and
- military justice.²¹

Of course, all international military students (IMS) trained in the continental United States (CONUS) are exposed to American values and culture. The Department of Defense Informational Program (IP)²² was established in 1965 to formalize this exposure to some extent, by providing IMS with opportunities to visit U.S. government institutions and other points of interest, such as labor unions, media offices, and factories. The Informational Program represents a deliberate attempt to impress foreign students with the values and theories needed for democratization in their own countries. However, the IP is a voluntary program and provides exposure to, but not training in, democratic values and concepts.

Deeming such informal exposure to U.S. democratic values and institutions insufficient, Congress passed the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 101-513) in FY 1991, mandating that not less than \$1 million of IMET funds shall be set aside for

developing, initiating, conducting and evaluating courses and other programs for training foreign civilian and military officials in managing and administering foreign military establishments and budgets, and for

Lefever suggests that, although professionalization leads to orderliness and moderation, some orderly governments are repressive.

²⁰In 1978, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act to incorporate a human rights clause in the statement of IMET objectives. Chapter 5, Section 543 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by the International Security Assistance Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 2347b).

²¹U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, 102d Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 137, No. 77, 21 May 1991, p. S6258, and Vol. 137, No. 9, Part II, 14 January 1991, p. S848.

²²The purpose of the Informational Program is defined in the *Joint Security Assistance (JSAT) Regulation*, Army Regulation 12-15, SECNAVINST 4950.4, AFR 50-29, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Departments of the Army, the Navy, and Air Force, 28 February 1990, Chapter 11. The IP, which has been in continuous operation since 1965, is intended to expose IMS to U.S. government institutions, the media, minority problems, the purpose and scope of labor unions, the American economic system, and U.S. public-education institutions. There are few guidelines regarding the implementation of the IP, which is entirely the responsibility of the individual international military student officer at each U.S. training facility. The Informational Program is funded at approximately \$3 million per year.

training foreign military and civilian officials in creating and maintaining effective military judicial systems and military codes of conduct, including observance of internationally recognized human rights . . . [civilian personnel] shall include foreign government personnel of ministries other than ministries of defense if the military education and training would (i) contribute to responsible defense resource management, (ii) foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military, or (iii) improve military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights.

The Defense Security Assistance Agency is the lead agent in developing and assigning appropriate courses for this expanded IMET (IMET-E) program, and security assistance officers in host nations are responsible for promoting foreign military and civilian attendance.²³ The basic assumption underlying IMET-E is that training foreign civilian and military personnel in issues related to civil-military relations, human rights, etc., can help promote the consolidation of democracy in host nations.²⁴ At the very least, IMET-E provides an opportunity to familiarize future foreign military and civilian leaders with U.S. political values and practical means by which to operationalize such values.

Only seven courses out of the 2,000 existing military courses meet the criteria for IMET-E, however. New courses are therefore being developed to address the specific goals of IMET-E. The defense resource management course (offered through the Defense Resource Management Institute at Monterey, California), for example, has added mobile education teams to meet the needs of foreign civilian and military personnel and has already been well attended worldwide. The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) is also supporting the development of the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School's course on civil-military strategies for internal development (CMSID) under the IMET-E program, as well as the Naval Justice School's development of a military justice and/or human rights course.²⁵

Extent of Training's Influence

The United States is thus in the process of reconsidering training in infra-structural development and of promoting training in democratic development.

²³The act's emphasis on training civilians is also new and is intended to familiarize foreign civilian officials with their militaries' functions and budgets, thereby further helping to promote foreign militaries' subordination to civilian control.

²⁴The role of IMET in democratization has been a subject of congressional concern. See, for example, *Congressional Record*, 14 January 1991, p. S850.

²⁵Interviews with Hank Garza, DSAA, January and May 1992 and February 1993.

Yet, the influence of U.S. training on foreign development, whether infrastructural or democratic, should be understood in context. Although U.S. military training can have a marginal effect on a country's internal politics, that effect is minor relative to the many larger influences on the direction a country's development will take, including social, historical, religious, economic, and international factors.²⁶ Even related, but contradictory, U.S. foreign policies can undermine the effectiveness of "developmental" training.²⁷ Thus, although United States officials claim that U.S.-trained foreign military personnel are more professional than their domestically trained counterparts, no consistent behavior is attributable to U.S.-trained officers. Some officers commit human-rights violations; others participate in disaster relief. Some officers use civic action projects to enrich themselves; others provide genuine developmental aid. Indeed, U.S.-trained officers have participated in military coups on both the loyalist and rebel sides.²⁸

The few months a foreign military student spends in the United States are unlikely to radically alter his cultural, social, or political views. International military students may acquire an improved understanding of the American political system and social culture, and some may develop an affection for the United States, but studies suggest that the majority of IMS will return to their home countries with the same basic *Weltanschauung* as when they left.²⁹

In the following case studies of Thailand and the Philippines, the extent and effects of U.S. IMET training in IDAD are examined in order to assess the validity of the various arguments for and against such training. The potential utility of

²⁶Wolf, Charles, Jr., *United States Policy in the Third World*, Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1967, p. 109.

²⁷In Thailand, for example, the United States cancelled IMET funds, to protest the 1992 coup, but continued to sell American weapons to the Thai military, arguing that such a policy prevented the loss of influence in Thailand that the United States would suffer were Thailand to be less dependent on U.S. arms and materiel. Indeed, there are many scholars who argue that training is provided to influence not internal politics but foreign policies: that regimes of every type (e.g., authoritarian, democratic, and socialist), regardless of their internal politics, have received U.S. security assistance (and training) because of the effects such aid is assumed to have on U.S. foreign policy interests. See, for example, Lefever, Ernest W., "Arms Transfers, Military Training, and Domestic Politics," in Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy, eds., *Arms Transfers in the Modern World*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979, pp. 276 and 282.

²⁸Ernest W. Lefever (1979, p. 279) makes a good point when he writes: "This does not mean that military aid has not had influence on domestic politics, but it does mean that its influence may be felt in several directions at the same time."

²⁹Lefever, 1979, p. 279.

the IMET-E program is also examined in the context of each country's political-military situation. Finally, the general success of IMET training in meeting U.S. goals and in protecting U.S. interests in the two case-study countries is evaluated.

3. Thailand

History

Political Role of the Thai Military

Since its inception in the late nineteenth century, the Thai military has played a dominant role in domestic politics. Such political involvement fell naturally to the military, which had evolved directly from the ranks of the bureaucracy. Indeed, prior to 1851, no distinction was made in Thailand between politicians and soldiers: In the event that an army was needed, the bureaucrats were responsible for raising and leading it. Therefore, even as the military was developing into a formal institution, it retained close ties to domestic politics. In 1905, for example, when Thailand was still run by the royal family, the crown prince became the commander in chief of the army; in 1912, the king himself created and led the Council of National Defense, an organization that equated military and civil affairs.¹

The military retained its political power after the coup d'état that brought Thailand a constitutional monarchy in 1932. Over the next 60 years, the military staged 17 coups, imposed martial law repeatedly, and remained in de facto control of the government. Nonetheless, the Thai military continually sought to legitimize its rule by cloaking it in the guise, and even relative substance, of democracy.² For most of those years, opposition parties were allowed to form, the press operated freely, and elections were held for civilian posts within the

¹Wilson, David A., "The Military in Thai Politics," in John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962, pp. 254-255.

²French-educated Thai civilian, military, and royal leaders had been "westernizers" since as early as the mid-nineteenth century, and they had tried over the years to implement as much democracy as seemed appropriate within their own system and culture. Comments by Guy Pauker, Santa Monica, RAND, 7 October 1992.

government.³ The military even competed in elections, through parties formed by various military factions.⁴

Over time, the Thai military cyclically allowed the popularly elected House of Representatives to grow and attain increasing political independence, although the military did sponsor legislation intended to slow the trend. With the February 1991 coup, the Thai military again reasserted its control. It reorganized the government and, as it had in the past, arranged for elections, which took place in March 1992.

For the most part, the Thai public has acquiesced to the military's involvement in domestic politics. The hierarchical organizing principles of the military have been completely harmonious with Thai culture⁵ and have represented such traditional Thai values as respect, deference, and loyalty. Moreover, King Bhudipol Aduldej, who is idolized within Thailand, has endorsed the military's political role.

With Thailand's rapid economic development, however, public concern about the military's domestic influence and pressure for real democracy have increased. This tendency was thrown into sharp relief in May 1992 with the riots and demonstrations that followed the appointment to prime minister of General Suchinda Kraprayoon. The March 1992 elections had brought a conservative five-party coalition into power, a coalition that was initially intended to appoint Narong Wongwan, a civilian, to the prime ministership. Narong was forced to decline the position because of a U.S. State Department announcement that he

³C. I. Eugene Kim, in "Asian Military Regimes: Political Systems and Style and Socio-Economic Performance," paper prepared for the Symposium on "Regional Comparative Analysis of Civil Military Regimes," Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society Conference, Chicago, October 1980, calls this phenomenon the "civilianization of the military" and makes the argument that military regimes that allow civilian inputs are more successful and enjoy better socioeconomic performance than military regimes that are not civilianized. Ernest Lefever (1979, p. 284) suggests specifically that professionalization of the military leads to civilianization and uses General Suharto's Indonesia as a case in point, where those officers trained at Leavenworth had learned the pragmatic, problem-solving approach, as well as the limitations of military personnel. Knowing that they were not qualified to run the economy, they delegated the responsibility to civilian economists. In the case of Thailand, the military civilianized, but maintained the option of taking over if the civilians did not perform effectively. Powell (1965, p. 389) argues that in cases such as Thailand, the civilians are not given the opportunity to develop their skills sufficiently to perform effectively because of the constant interruptions by the military, and that this cyclical process is detrimental to democratic development.

⁴Samuel Huntington (1984, p. 210) describes this form of democratic "development" as the "cyclical model of alternating despotism and democracy. . . . In this case, key elites normally accept, at least superficially, the legitimacy of democratic forms. Elections are held from time to time, but rarely is there any sustained succession of governments coming to power through the electoral process. Governments are as often the product of military interventions as they are of elections. Once a military junta takes over, it will normally promise to return power to civilian rule. In due course, it does so. . . . In a praetorian situation like this, neither authoritarian nor democratic institutions are effectively institutionalized."

⁵Wilson, 1962, pp. 254-255.

had been denied a visa to the United States because of evidence linking him to drug-trafficking. General Suchinda, the military officer who led the February 1991 coup against the democratically elected government, had in the past claimed an unconditional intent to remain out of politics; he had therefore not run for, nor been elected to, a position in parliament in the March 1992 elections. Under pressure from his colleagues, however, Suchinda reconsidered and agreed to become prime minister following Narong's withdrawal, arguing that a continuing leadership vacuum would threaten Thailand's economic interests.⁶

Immediately following the general's appointment to the prime ministership, four opposition parties issued a statement that the ascension of any nonelected prime minister violated "the principle of democratic rule and the democratic ideals of the Thai people."⁷ An editorial in Bangkok's *The Nation* newspaper chastised the parliament, stating that

such abasement before the military leaders was unbecoming of important political leaders in a democratic system. It sent the generals a message that they could continue to interfere in the parliamentary system at will.⁸

Another Bangkok newspaper went so far as to speculate on the utility of teaching young people about ethics, patriotism, and morality in light of Suchinda's appointment.⁹

The immensely popular politician Chamlong Srimuang, former governor of Bangkok, led a peaceful demonstration against the appointment of Suchinda. He undertook a highly publicized fast, accepting no medical care and only water. Thousands of Thais from all levels of Thai society turned out in his support. The demonstrations suddenly became violent, however, and were met with a brutal crackdown by the Thai military and the imposition of martial law.¹⁰ These

⁶There has been speculation that Narong was selected as a candidate precisely because he would be discredited, with Suchinda waiting in the sidelines to assume the prime ministership. In an interview with U.S. Embassy staff, however, this argument was dismissed (Bangkok, June 1992) as it was by other political sources. See Tasker, Rodney, "Premier of Last Resort," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 16 April 1992, p. 11.

⁷Shenon, Philip, "Top Thai General Appointed Leader," *New York Times*, 8 April 1992, p. A4.

⁸Cited in Tasker, Rodney, "Regroup and Dig In," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 2 April 1992, pp. 11-12.

⁹Reuters, 10 April 1992.

¹⁰Some eyewitnesses to the riots report that the violence was begun by a small group of agitators who were separate from the larger, peaceful demonstration. There are also unsubstantiated claims that some of the violent agitators were later seen in uniform shooting against the crowd, fueling accusations that the military initiated the violence in an attempt to delegitimize Chamlong and his supporters.

events resulted in the intervention of the king, who brought together Suchinda and Chamlong and asked them to compromise.¹¹

Within a week of the king's intervention, the embattled prime minister stepped down. The parliament adopted four measures designed to increase the level of democracy in the government, including a measure requiring the prime minister to be elected by members of parliament. After some deliberations leading to concern that a less politically palatable, military candidate would be named, Mr. Anand Panyarachun (who is not an elected member of parliament) was appointed interim prime minister.¹²

Anand, who headed the last interim government, took major steps in the next few months to limit the military's economic and political power: He revoked the supreme commander's power to respond to internal unrest; dissolved the Capital Security Command; reassigned the supreme commander, the army commander, the deputy army commander, and the commander of forces around the capital to positions of relative obscurity; licensed private television channels to compete with those run by the military; and helped wrest control of Thai Airways from the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF).

In the September 1992 general election, antimilitary parties won a slim majority of parliamentary seats and chose Mr. Chuan Leekpai of the Democrat party as prime minister. Although the margin of victory was slim, the antimilitary parties fared better than had been anticipated, boding a good future for the democracy movement in Thailand. Shortly after the election, the new prime minister's cabinet revoked the Internal Security Act, thereby limiting the military's powers to mobilize troops and order military operations throughout the country.

U.S. military and civilian officials generally agree that the May events were a watershed in Thai politics¹³ and could signal a change in Thailand's internal balance of power similar to the one that occurred in South Korea in the mid-1980s.¹⁴ Nonetheless, with high-level political positions still held by military and

¹¹ Although Chamlong Srimuang has claimed that he has no aspirations for the prime ministership, a U.S. Embassy staff member in Bangkok suggested in an interview (June 1992, Bangkok) that Chamlong would very much like to become prime minister. In July 1992, Chamlong told a press lunch in Tokyo (*Reuters*, July 1992) that he would be ready to assume the position of prime minister if his Palang Dharma party won a majority vote in the September 13 elections. He also stated that, as prime minister, he would remove military leaders from state enterprises and take the military leaders out of politics.

¹² Tasker, Rodney, "Down, but Not Yet Out," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 18 June 1992, pp. 10-11.

¹³ Interviews with U.S. Embassy and the Joint United States Military Assistance Group, Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI), staff, Bangkok, June 1992.

¹⁴ Indeed, interim Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun has called for a dramatic reorganization of the military that would prevent individual military officers from gaining too much political power.

ex-military officers, the armed forces' continued influence should not be underestimated.

Thai Military Doctrine and Force Structure

The Thai military has undergone numerous changes since 1932, particularly in doctrine and force structure. Whereas the military had been externally oriented against the potential threats posed by China and the British and French territories on its borders, in the late 1960s Thailand began to reorganize its military to fight the communist insurgency that began in 1965.¹⁵ Initially, the Thais relied on U.S. support in battling the counterinsurgency and duplicated the United States's approach in Vietnam. As it became obvious that the United States was not winning the war in Vietnam, however, the Thais began to move farther and farther from U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, a process that accelerated after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Thailand in 1975-1976. During this period, the Thais placed more emphasis on nation-building and civic action, while continuing to employ American-style tactical military maneuvers.¹⁶ Under Prime Ministerial Orders Nos. 66/23 and 65/25 in 1980,¹⁷ however, the Thai military adopted an almost Maoist strategy of counterinsurgency, whereby they emphasized wooing the population from the insurgents, eliminating the insurgents' bases, and creating conditions that would deny the insurgents legitimacy. To this end, the Thai military combined strikes and raids on insurgent strongholds with small-unit investigative and psychological operations at the village level, an open-arms amnesty program, and extensive civil-affairs and nation-building operations.¹⁸

¹⁵ Thai counterinsurgency doctrine is outlined in Prime Ministerial Order No. 66/2523.

¹⁶ In the early 1960s, the Thai government had already deployed mobile development units and information teams composed of both military and civilian personnel. The mobile development units consisted of approximately 120 people who possessed limited engineering and medical capabilities. The Accelerated Rural Development Program was initiated in 1965 as a follow-up to the mobile development units and constructed roads and performed other civic action missions.

¹⁷ The Thai army dropped all public reference to Prime Ministerial Order No. 66/23 in 1989, claiming that publication of the order actually spurred on the communists. Nonetheless, the Thais recommended the counterinsurgency strategy described in the order to the Filipinos. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 June 1989.

¹⁸ Slade, Stuart, "Successful Counterinsurgency: How Thais Burnt the Books and Beat the Guerrillas," *Internal Security and CO-IN (Supplement to International Defense Review)*, October 1989, pp. 21-25; Thonglek, Nipat, *Thailand's Revolutionary War, 1965-1982*, paper written for A558 Internal War and Revolution, 14 May 1990; *A Case Study of Thailand's Counterinsurgency Operations, 1965-1982*, Counter-Revolutionary Warfare Committee, Department of Joint and Combined Operations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990; interview with Major General Charn Boonprasert, Commandant of the Army War College, Bangkok, June 1992.

Some combination of this approach and China's decision to stop supporting the communist insurgents in Thailand after Vietnam's entry into Cambodia in 1975 led to the effective end of the insurgency in the early 1980s.¹⁹

Prioritizing the Thai military's counterinsurgency capabilities may have helped stifle the insurgency, but it left the Thais unprepared for conventional warfare. Nor has any systematic reorganization of the Thai military taken place since the insurgents' defeat. The Thai military therefore operates well in small units—individual elements such as the special forces and the counterterrorism units are highly professional²⁰—but the military's general logistics, training, and command and control structure remain inadequate.²¹

Since the mid-1980s, the Thais have put a premium on the development of their military capabilities, although the emphasis still appears to be on arms purchases rather than development of a broad strategic vision. A steady flow of American weapons and equipment, as well as Chinese—and, more recently, Eastern European—arms purchases, has given the Thais an admirable arsenal. The arms purchases would suggest that the Thai military is planning against the kind of external threat Vietnam posed in the past, yet National Security Council Secretary-General Gen Charun Kulawanich forecasts that no such threat lies in Thailand's immediate future.²² Moreover, despite the Thai military's apparent interest in conventional missions, the armed forces continue to pursue nonconventional activities such as counternarcotics and nation-building operations. Such an ad hoc approach leaves the Thai military in the unenviable position of preparing for missions at both extremes of the operational continuum without the benefit of up-to-date doctrine to guide it.²³

¹⁹Some U.S. military officials question the effectiveness of the Thais' counterinsurgency approach, and credit China's withdrawal of support for the end of the insurgency. Thai officials, however, take great pride in their counterinsurgency doctrine, and ascribe to it most of the credit for the end of the insurgency.

²⁰Interview with Major Robert Borja, U.S. Army Infantry, JUSMAGTHAI, 17 June 1992.

²¹Robert Karniol, in "Thailand's Armed Forces: From Counterinsurgency to Conventional Warfare," *International Defense Review*, February 1992, p. 103, cites the 1987–1989 conflict between Thai and Laotian forces at the border town of Ban Romklao to support this argument. The conflict ended in a cease-fire rather than a definitive win for the Thais. Karniol suggested that this was the case because of the Thais' poor intelligence and training, inadequate logistical and resupply capabilities, and weak command and control structure. In "Return Salvo," *Manager*, December 1991, pp. 21–23, Thai Major-General Chaturith Phromsaka, Secretary of the Royal Thai Army (RTA), responded to Karniol's charges, claiming that Ban Romklao was a "minor combat engagement" of little significance, and that the Thai army functions more than adequately, especially at the division level. Chaturith acknowledged that the RTA needs improvement at the battalion level, but said training at the battalion level is under way.

²²NSC Chief: "No Major Military Threat in Five Years," *Bangkok Post*, 30 December 1991.

²³In a discussion with General Charan Kullavanijaya, Chief, Thai National Security Council, at RAND, Santa Monica, Calif., May 1992, the general acknowledged that such diverse missions posed difficulties for the Thai army.

The explanation for such an approach is twofold. First, the Thai military's neglect of doctrinal development results from the Royal Thai Armed Forces' (RTARF) culture: Not only do the services compete among themselves for political and economic power, but factions within the services compete against each other. The army, for example, is broken into factions by Class; that is, the alumni of the Chulachomklao Military Academy for any given year.²⁴ Graduates of each Class are fiercely loyal to their classmates, and classmates will cooperate to ensure their class's ascendancy. The practice really began with Class 5, which currently dominates: As of 31 March 1992, the top four Royal Thai Army (RTA) posts were held by Class 5 graduates, and eight of the 13 top army officers were Class 5 alumni. Ascending Classes include Classes 11 and 13, whose members are becoming increasingly powerful in the political and economic arenas. The Thai military leadership, responsible for guiding and driving military development, is so immersed in this political and commercial competition that doctrinal development has fallen by the wayside, as have training and logistics.²⁵

Second, the continued emphasis on nation-building and COIN derives from the Thai military's claim that there is a continuing internal communist threat against which the military must defend the northeastern and southern regions of Thailand. Such a spurious claim²⁶ is in the Thai military's interests. As one Royal Thai Army official described it, the responsibility of the RTARF is to complete the last stage of the counterinsurgency by promoting democratic and economic development, thereby giving the Thai population a concrete alternative to communism. He explained, for example, that where corrupt civilian politicians threaten such development, the armed forces must remove and

²⁴Class 5 refers to the fifth class of military cadets who graduated in 1958 from Chulachomklao Military Academy. Chulachomklao's curriculum was adopted almost completely from West Point. These students are actually together since the time they enter military preparatory school at age 15. Indeed, one's Class is really determined by the year one enters the preparatory school: When a student moves ahead or falls behind at Chulachomklao, he is still considered a member of the original preparatory-school Class.

²⁵A Thai military officer confirmed this impression in an interview. When asked if Thai military leadership was sometimes involved in business and politics to the detriment of military development and overall capabilities he replied, "Not sometimes . . . always." Interview, Bangkok, June 1992. This is not to say, however, that the entire Thai military is involved in such endeavors. Within the army, for example, military excellence is highly valued and regarded until a student enters the Command and General Staff College. At that point, he must not only develop mentors among higher ranking military officers, but must cultivate political and business connections, as well. Interview with U.S. Army officer, Bangkok, June 1992. Military commercial interests include two television stations, five radio stations, the Thai telephone system and port authority, executive authority over Thai Airways International and the Thai Military Bank, as well as controlling interests in major construction companies to which many military contracts are awarded. Wallace, Charles P., "Military Leadership Under the Gun in Southeast Asia," *Los Angeles Times*, 21 July 1992; interview with senior U.S. military personnel, Bangkok, June 1992.

²⁶None of the U.S. civilian or military officials interviewed believe that any real insurgent threat exists in Thailand today. Indeed, some U.S. and Army officials claimed that the same few hundred remaining insurgents are trotted out into the public eye each year to help justify the army's continuing control.

replace them.²⁷ Continuing nation-building operations also allow members of the armed forces interested in winning public office to increase their popularity and provide opportunities for profit.²⁸ Finally, a military presence throughout Thailand makes the execution of border—or cross-border—operations a simpler and less obvious task.²⁹

The lack of any real external or internal threat to act as a catalyst, combined with the Thai military culture and the advantages of continuing IDAD operations, has worked against the Thai military's development. The goal of the Thai military has become self-preservation, and the means have become political and economic. Ironically, what is preserved is an increasingly anachronistic doctrine and a status quo capability that does not conform to the expensive state-of-the-art equipment and weapons Thailand is amassing against an unknown future external threat.

U.S. Interests and Efforts in Thailand

U.S. relations with Thailand date back to the early nineteenth century. The bilateral Treaty of Amity and Commerce, signed by the United States and Thailand in 1835, was the first treaty between the United States and an Asian country, and represented the beginning of the cooperative and resilient relationship between the two nations. The first time the issue of developmental assistance arose between the two countries was in 1865, when the king of Thailand offered elephants to the United States to aid in the development of the U.S. frontier. The two countries were allies in World War I, and although Thailand declared war on the United States during World War II, the United States considered the declaration a result of Japanese occupation. Since World War II, the United States and Thailand have both signed the Manila Pact³⁰ and continue to maintain a bilateral security understanding.

²⁷ Interview with RTA general, Bangkok, June 1992. The general was closely involved in the Thai development of COIN doctrine under General Chaovalit. For a discussion of the philosophy behind the doctrine, see Bunbongkarn, Suchit, *The Military in Thai Politics 1981-1986*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987.

²⁸ Interview with Dr. Suchit Bunbongkarn, Bangkok, June 1992; interviews with American military officers, Bangkok, June 1992.

²⁹ Interview with U.S. Army officer, Bangkok, June 1992.

³⁰ The United States and Thailand's treaty relationship dates back to the 1954 Manila Pact, which was also signed by the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Pakistan, France, and the Philippines. The Manila Pact provided the foundation for the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, which emulated Europe's NATO. However, the Manila Pact never made clear the degree or type of commitment each member owed the others.

Thailand's strategic location, substantial resources, and compatible free-market enterprise system would have guaranteed U.S. interest in the country even if the two did not share security concerns. Thailand borders some of Southeast Asia's major narcotics exporters, is only 50 miles from China, and lies near the major oil routes between the Middle East and Japan. The United States is permitted both overflight and landing rights and, during the Vietnam War, maintained bases in Thailand. Thailand's open market provides private investment opportunities for U.S. corporations, and Thai tin, rubber, rice, and textiles are exported to the United States. Given the extent of the two countries' mutual interests, it is not surprising that the United States demonstrates its dedication to Thailand's continued prosperity and stability with substantial assistance—both military and economic—each year.³¹

International Military Education and Training

Of the total U.S. expenditures for military assistance to Thailand, international military education and training (IMET) funding constitutes less than 14 percent.³² Like many U.S. officials, U.S. Ambassador to Thailand David Lambertson contends that this is a relatively small amount and that IMET provides a "big bang for the buck." He asserts, however, that IMET should not be considered aid but a device for exposing international military students to the United States, thus improving military-to-military relationships and increasing U.S. access to foreign militaries.³³ The development of military ties is indeed the United States' first priority, as outlined in Section 543 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Two further purposes of the IMET program, however, are

- to improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained by them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries; and

³¹ Assistance comprises military assistance and economic assistance. Economic assistance includes the economic support fund (ESF), development assistance, P.L. 480, the Peace Corps, and International Narcotics Control. The request for military assistance in 1991 accounted for approximately 42 percent of the total request for assistance. See the annual United States of America Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs.

³² Military assistance includes Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the international military education and training program (IMETP). See the annual U.S. Congress Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs.

³³ Interview with the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand David Lambertson, Bangkok, 18 June 1992. All the Embassy and JUSMAGTHAI personnel interviewed agreed that U.S. training makes Thai soldiers more accessible to the United States. Each interviewee provided anecdotal evidence, citing instances in which Thai officials had proudly presented or displayed certificates from their training in the United States.

- to increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such activities of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights.

In Thailand, the specific intent of IMET has been to help professionalize the military while improving its in-country technical training and professional military education. To that end, Thai troops have been trained in a variety of courses. Between 1988 and 1990, the U.S. Army courses most attended by Thais, with a total of 10 or more Thai attendees over the three-year period, are listed in Table 3.1.

Upon completion of their U.S. training, Thai military personnel are required to spend two to three years training their Thai counterparts in the skills they

Table 3.1
Most-Attended U.S. Army Courses, Thai Troops

| Course | No. of Students (1988-90) |
|--|---------------------------|
| Special English Language Training | 229 |
| Field Artillery Firefinder Radar Operator (radar-type TPQ 36) | 42 |
| Various Instructor Training | 28 |
| Rotary Wing Instrument | 26 |
| Adjutant General Officer Advanced | 19 |
| <i>Psychological Operations Unit Officer</i> | 15 |
| <i>Airborne</i> | 15 |
| AH-1F Helicopter Aviator Qualification | 15 |
| <i>Ranger</i> | 14 |
| <i>On-the-job Maintenance Training—CONUS</i> | 14 |
| <i>International Intelligence Officer Basic</i> | 14 |
| <i>Public Affairs Officer</i> | 12 |
| <i>International Officer Preparation</i> | 12 |
| <i>Command and General Staff Officer</i> | 12 |
| <i>Observer Operations—CONUS</i> | 11 |
| Infantry Officer Advanced | 11 |
| Finance Officer Basic* | 11 |
| Allied Officer Preparation—Infantry Officer Advanced | 11 |
| Adjutant General Officer Basic | 11 |
| UH-1 Instructor Pilot | 10 |
| Military Personnel Officer/Personnel Technician | 10 |
| <i>Civil Affairs</i> | 10 |

SOURCE: *Country Training Extract, Thailand, by Country, School, Course per FY*, Security Assistance Training Field Agency (SATFA), prepared 24 July 1992.

NOTE: The courses were categorized by the author, with help from an Army officer familiar with course contents. The categorizations are illustrative rather than definitive. The italicized courses are of particular utility to internal defense and development. The asterisked courses have carryover potential for building up human capital in skills useful for internal development.

acquired in the United States. Ideally, this practice should result over time in an independent Thai training capability. Yet, 40 years after the United States began training Thai military students, it is clear that an independent Thai capability would conflict with the primary rationale for IMET: continued U.S. training of significant numbers of Thai military students. Moreover, the Thais themselves are unwilling to give up U.S. training: Not only is U.S. training nearly a prerequisite for advancement to the top echelons of the military services (particularly the army), but the services are concerned that without U.S. training they will not have access to state-of-the-art tactics and techniques.³⁴

The United States has trained 20,932 Thai officers since the training program began in 1952. In that year, the United States trained 58 Thai officers. Fifteen years later, preceding and during the Vietnam War, the United States was training up to 1,500 Thai officers a year. More recently, until IMET was cancelled following the February 1991 coup, the United States was training approximately 350 Thais a year. IMET was reinstated following Thai elections in September 1992 and the installation of a stable, democratically elected government. But the number of Thai students who receive U.S. military training has been decreasing steadily. In 1993, 187 Thai students attended training in the United States, after the original allotment of \$2.0 million for IMET in Thailand was supplemented by mid-year and end-of-the-year money, bringing the total to \$2.4 million spent. This substantial cutback resulted, in part, from lower annual allocations of IMET funds to Thailand. IMET funding for FY 1994 has been cut by 50 percent, to \$875,000, which will allow Thailand to send students to only expanded-IMET and senior-PME courses. It is not yet clear whether the Thais will buy this training.³⁵

The effects of cutbacks in IMET funding have been exacerbated by new rules regarding the payment of travel and living allowances (TLA). Whereas the United States and Thailand have had a unique arrangement in the past of the United States' paying a portion of Thai TLA, the United States is responsible for all TLA in 1993 and 1994. Fewer IMET monies are therefore available for courses. JUSMAGTHAI has proposed that, in FY 1995, the United States pay full TLA for non-PME courses only and, in FY 1996 and beyond, that Thailand pay full TLA. This agreement should result in a \$1-million savings to the IMET program, allowing 150 additional students to attend training in the United States. Of course, if Thailand assumes these costs, still fewer students may be sent to the

³⁴Interviews with U.S. and Thai military personnel, Bangkok, June 1992.

³⁵Memo given to author by Major Joe Judge, acting Chief, Joint Training Branch, JUSMAGTHAI, Bangkok, December 1993.

United States because of the Thai government's inability to afford TLA for all the qualified students.³⁶

The declining IMET funds and the TLA situation have resulted in decreasing numbers of Thai students receiving U.S. training, which will, in turn, have a significant impact on the Thai military and will compound a preexisting problem, namely, the allocation of limited course seats among the Thai services. For example, all the services compete regularly for seats in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; those seats are usually allocated on a rotating basis—meaning that a service has to wait two years before it can send students to the school.³⁷ During the suspension of IMET, a backlog of students developed and services anticipated waiting up to six years for a CGSC seat. Although that backlog has been redressed, the cutbacks in numbers of students who can attend such training in the United States may well lead to similar backlogs and could ultimately affect whether U.S. training is used as a prerequisite for advancement to the higher ranks of the Thai military.

Thai troops, especially those chosen for U.S. training, remain in the military a long time (see Table 3.2). A 30-year career, for example, is not unusual. Assuming a 30-year career average, more than 5 percent of the total 1990 RTARF was U.S.-trained, not including the significant number of Thais who had, over

Table 3.2
Percentage of RTARF Officers with In-CONUS
U.S. Training, by Length of Career

| Year | Length of Career (yr) | | | |
|------|-----------------------|----|----|----|
| | 5 | 10 | 20 | 30 |
| 1965 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 7 |
| 1975 | 2 | 4 | 7 | 8 |
| 1985 | 0.5 | 1 | 4 | 7 |
| 1990 | 0.4 | 1 | 3 | 6 |

SOURCE: *Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts*, Washington, D.C.: Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), Comptroller, Data Management Division, annual.

³⁶TLA has been a longstanding problem for Thailand, and the issue has been repeatedly raised since the 1970s. Interview with LTC Russell Webster, JUSMAGTHAI, Bangkok, June 1992; memo given to author by Major Joe Judge, JUSMAGTHAI, Bangkok, December 1993.

³⁷Roundtable discussion with JUSMAGTHAI personnel and Thai Supreme Command and Ministry of Defense personnel, Bangkok, June 1992.

the years, received U.S. military training outside the continental United States (OCONUS) through mobile training teams (MTTs) or joint exercises.³⁸

Measures of Influence

Yet, numbers trained are not necessarily a fair representation of the amount of influence U.S. training can have. The effects of U.S. training are multiplied by three factors:

- U.S.-trained troops become trainers;
- The U.S. trains potential leaders;
- Thai training institutions use U.S. doctrine and training manuals.

U.S.-Trained Personnel Become Trainers. A condition of U.S. military training is that, upon return to their home countries, international military students trained by the United States must be utilized in positions appropriate to their training. For example, engineers must perform engineering duties and infantrymen must be placed in infantry units. The United States prefers that this requirement be met by employing returning military personnel as trainers in their fields. In Thailand, in deference to U.S. regulations, many military personnel trained in the United States return to two- or three-year training posts at the Thai Command and General Staff College (CGSC) or other Thai training institutions. Frequently, however, such personnel may perform little actual training and instead act as aides to senior military personnel.³⁹ In other instances, the military's need to immediately employ returning personnel precludes their use as trainers.⁴⁰ Although the JUSMAGTHAI has been required by the U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency to track the placement of returning students, there has been no formal procedure for doing so. The only means of tracking students once they return to Thailand was to withhold their retainable instructional material (RIM) at JUSMAGTHAI until the students came in for them and were debriefed by JUSMAG personnel. JUSMAG staff are beginning the process of developing means of tracking returning students, however. They are discussing the possibility of circulating questionnaires to

³⁸In 1991, for example, 52 of the 343 Thai students (15 percent) scheduled for U.S. military training were to be trained OCONUS. Cited in Beard, Barry M., *Royal Thai Armed Forces Security Assistance Training Program FY 92-93*, JUSMAGTHAI, February 1991.

³⁹Interview with U.S. military and Embassy personnel, 16 June 1992.

⁴⁰Interview with Thai Supreme Command and Royal Thai Navy personnel, Bangkok, 19 June 1992.

returning students⁴¹ and are also considering conducting checks at Thai service schools to ensure that returning students are appropriately placed as trainers. As yet, however, these measures are in the early planning stages.⁴²

Despite these problems, many of the U.S.-trained Thai military students do perform training in their own country. The courses they run usually replicate the courses they took in the United States. Thailand's military training capability has thus changed over time and become more sophisticated. The Thais now perform most of their own basic training and rely on the United States for more advanced training, including professional military education.⁴³

U.S. Trains Potential Leaders. Western training is not new to the Thai military. By the late nineteenth century, Thai military officers were being sent to Europe for training on a regular basis. Today, however, most of the senior military leadership in Thailand has been trained in the United States.⁴⁴ For example, in June 1992, seven out of 13 of the top posts in the RTA were held by U.S.-trained Thais. The commandant of the RTA Command and General Staff College was also U.S. trained, as were the RTA director of intelligence and the deputy superintendent of the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy.⁴⁵ Of the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) personnel on the January 1992 protocol list, 9 percent are U.S.-trained, but a full 12 percent of the RTN headquarters staff received U.S. training. Twenty-five percent of those listed on the RTAF's *Commanding and Staff Officers' List* were trained in the United States. Of the October 1991 roster of senior officers in the Ministry of Defense, 54 percent are U.S.-trained; 29 percent of the senior officers in the Supreme Command received U.S. training. Of the top eight senior officers in the Supreme Command in October 1991, seven trained in the United States.⁴⁶ Given that, at most, 5 percent of the total Royal Thai Armed

⁴¹This has been attempted in other countries: In some cases, less than 5 percent of the questionnaires would be returned. Moreover, unless the JUSMAGs went out and verified at least a sampling of the responses, there would be no way of knowing how accurate they were.

⁴²Interviews with LTC Russell Webster, Major Joe Judge, JUSMAGTHAI, Bangkok, June 1992. Personnel at JUSMAGTHAI suggested that Thai basic training could still do with some improvement, but that advanced training has become a priority.

⁴³Interview with Mr. Victor Tomseth, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, June 1992.

⁴⁴Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), U.S. Embassy, and JUSMAG personnel interviewed agreed that U.S. training is almost a prerequisite for advancement in the Thai military.

⁴⁵Of course, in August 1992, then-Prime Minister Anand replaced the army commander, supreme commander, and air force commander with General Vimol Wongwanich, then-Air Chief Marshal Voranart Apichart, and then-Air Chief Marshal Gun Pimarnthip, respectively. Of the three, only General Vimol Wongwanich received no U.S. training during his career. Prime Minister Anand's defense minister, retired General Banchob Bunnag, also received training in the United States.

⁴⁶*Royal Thai Navy Protocol List*, Bangkok: Foreign Liaison Division, Naval Intelligence Department, January 1992; *Roster of Senior Officers of Ministry of Defense and Supreme Command*, prepared by Khun Noi, Army Division, JUSMAGTHAI, Bangkok, 1 October 1991; *Commanding and*

Forces (RTARF) are U.S. trained, these numbers are significant. They indicate that U.S. training and RTARF leadership are indeed related.

It will be instructive to see what effect the cutback in numbers of Thai military students trained in the United States will have on the criteria for reaching the senior levels in the Thai military. If nothing else, the above numbers clearly indicate that the cutbacks in U.S. training will severely curtail the numbers of Thai leaders trained in the United States. The Thais could respond either by conducting their own training or by taking advantage of other countries' training programs. For example, RTARF students have trained in Australia, England, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, China, the Philippines, and Germany.⁴⁷ Yet, U.S. training carries such prestige within the Thai military that Australia's military training program, which is offered to Thai military personnel completely free of charge, has difficulty recruiting Thai military students, who prefer to wait and enter U.S. service schools.⁴⁸ One senior RTARF official, when asked what effects the cutbacks in IMET would have, said that rather than resorting to other countries' training programs, RTARF personnel would be trained in-country.⁴⁹

Thai Military Uses U.S. Doctrine and Training Manuals. Training within the Thai military is strongly influenced by U.S. doctrine and training practices. The Thai Command and General Staff College, the RTAF Flying Training School, and the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy each adopted elements of the U.S. curriculum and use U.S. training and field manuals as the basis of their instruction. Thais returning from training in the United States will bring back retainable instructional materials (RIM) and translate them themselves for the classes they teach.⁵⁰ U.S. training materials are nonetheless scarce. One U.S. Army major responsible for joint U.S.-Thai special forces exercises complained that the Thais rely on U.S. doctrine and manuals for their counternarcotics and close-quarters combat training, but do not have enough materials to go around.⁵¹

The Thais make some attempt to update and modify the U.S. materials, but they are faced with a mammoth task: making U.S. doctrine and training manuals—

Staff Officers' List Royal Thai Air Force, Bangkok, April 1992; *Royal Thai Army Roster*, Bangkok, as of 31 March 1992.

⁴⁷ Webster, Russell J., *Royal Thai Armed Forces Security Assistance Training Program FY 93/94*, Joint Exercise and Training Division, JUSMAGTHAI, February 1992.

⁴⁸ Phone interview with LTC Russell Webster, JUSMAG Thailand, 13 May 1992.

⁴⁹ Interview with RADM Chaichit Ratanapol, Chief of the RTN Coordinating Authority, Bangkok, June 1992. RADM Chaichit also admitted, however, that the RTN has not developed an adequate pool of instructors for such an endeavor.

⁵⁰ Interviews with Thai military personnel, Bangkok, June 1992.

⁵¹ Interview with MAJ Robert Borja, U.S. Army Infantry, JUSMAGTHAI, 17 June 1992.

designed to meet the needs of the massive U.S. military, mostly in the context of a European war—fit their own needs.⁵² Although the drawbacks of using U.S. doctrine are clear, little independent development of doctrine or training manuals is taking place.

The one exception is COIN doctrine. Development of an independent COIN doctrine is a point of great pride for the Thai military, especially the army. Now, however, as the military slowly reconfigures for a more conventional strategy, no comparable development of a strictly Thai conventional strategy is being undertaken.

Internal Defense and Development, and Democratization

Except for the late 1960s and early 1970s, when U.S. forces were stationed in Thailand and involved in combating the Thai insurgency, U.S. training for Thais has been almost completely conventional. Indeed, even in the period between 1976 and 1980, after the United States withdrew its bases from Thailand and the Thai military was beginning to develop its own COIN doctrine, significant numbers of Thai students received U.S. training—but the training was conventionally oriented. Because the Thai military not only developed its own COIN strategy but is sufficiently capable of training engineers, doctors, and others in traditional nation-building skills, it has tended to prefer U.S. training in more sophisticated conventional tactical skills.⁵³ Of the U.S. Army training provided to the Thais between 1988 and 1990, for example, 35 percent was relevant to internal defense or internal development and included courses directly relevant to counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and nation-building in such fields as engineering, medicine, water treatment, utilities repairing, animal care, civil affairs, transportation, psychological operations, intelligence, and military policing.⁵⁴ It also included courses such as CGSC, Judge Advocate General (JAG), logistics, public affairs, and resource management that build up human capital in internal development skills or broadly improve the general

⁵²It is also interesting that the manuals and doctrine are translated by returning students, not by professional translators, leaving room for misunderstanding and misinterpretation.

⁵³The United States does provide some training in civic action and related operations through joint-combined exercises like Cobra Gold; indeed, although the 1992 Cobra Gold was cancelled after the May riots in Bangkok, the civic action component was still held for all branches of the military. RADM Chaichit Ratanapol of the Royal Thai Navy strongly believes that such training is helpful. Interview, Bangkok, June 1992; interview with Dean of Political Science Dr. Suchit Bunbongkarn, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, June 1992.

⁵⁴Courses such as these accounted for only 16 percent of the training provided by the U.S. Army to Thailand between 1988 and 1991. See the *Country Training Extract, by Country, School and Course per FY* provided by SATFA.

capability of the military. Of all the courses applicable to IDAD, however, only "Terrorism in Low Intensity Conflict" was not applicable across the entire operational continuum.

The United States has not actively promoted IDAD training to the Thais. When asked whether IDAD is or was ever a U.S. priority in Thailand, the chief of the Joint Training Branch of JUSMAGTHAI acknowledged that he was not familiar with the concept of IDAD.⁵⁵ Moreover, JUSMAGTHAI has not been involved in the course-selection process in recent years, and, despite a fairly lengthy annual process of determining which courses they will need from the United States, the Thais have requested the same courses each year and the standard training list has been resubmitted without changes.⁵⁶ JUSMAGTHAI is in the process of developing a new means of programming courses when the IMET sanctions are lifted: JUSMAG personnel will offer suggestions to the Thais on which courses will be most helpful, which should significantly improve the quality of training that the United States provides the Thai military. It is not clear that the Thais are fully aware either of what courses are available or which are most appropriate for a given student.⁵⁷

Even had the United States encouraged IDAD training, however, it is unlikely that the Thais would have been interested. Indeed, the Thai military believes it is vastly more capable than the American military in such matters. As part of the larger COIN strategy developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Royal Thai Army implemented an enormous nation-building effort. Today, the Thai Army is still involved in internal development. For example, a huge rural development program called the "greening of the northeast" is being undertaken in the poor northeast region of Thailand. Major General Chaturith Phromsaka, secretary of the Royal Thai Army, said in December 1991 that the RTA's mandate is to

- (1) defend the country;
- (2) defend the monarchy;
- (3) deter insurgency forces within the country;
- (4) maintain national security; and
- (5) assist in the development of the country.⁵⁸

⁵⁵Interview with LTC Russell Webster, Bangkok, June 1992.

⁵⁶Interview with LTC Russell Webster, JUSMAGTHAI, Bangkok, June 1992.

⁵⁷Roundtable discussions with JUSMAGTHAI, Royal Thai Navy, Supreme Command, and Ministry of Defense personnel, Bangkok, June 1992.

⁵⁸Phromsaka, Chaturith, "Return Salvo," *Manager*, December 1991, pp. 21-23.

In order to fulfill the last responsibility, four development divisions were created, each one stationed in a different army region. The 20,000-men divisions, which account in total for 42 percent of the Thai Army,⁵⁹ are trained in flood and famine relief, forestry projects, and engineering.⁶⁰

Some detractors argue that the expansion of the RTARF's role is completely self-serving and that nation-building operations are a form of mass psychological operations intended to build general support for the military as well as future political support for individual officers with political aspirations.⁶¹ The military, for its part, claims that internal development operations are simply part of their overall COIN strategy and help quell the "dark influences" that endanger democracy both in the rural areas—where big capitalists "oppress and exploit the poor"—and in the parliament and political parties.⁶² Indeed, the Thai military claims to want nothing other than a perfect democracy, which they describe as having one mass party rather than a number of small parties and an appointed senate—which they consider a more democratic institution than the elected House of Representatives.⁶³

It is precisely this state of civil-military relations that the U.S. IMET-E program is intended to address. When asked whether they considered such a training program desirable, Thai Ministry of Defense⁶⁴ and Supreme Command personnel expressed interest in the defense resource management component, as did senior RTA officers; Royal Thai Navy personnel said that IMET-E would not be helpful for them. Contradicting the argument that training militaries in civil-military relations simply makes them more anxious to control political affairs, Dr. Suchit Bunbongkorn and the Thai RTA liaison to JUSMAG both agreed that

⁵⁹The Army Corps of Engineers is also active in such endeavors, according to Chaturith, 1991, pp. 21-23.

⁶⁰The total number of Thai forces is 283,000, of which 190,000 are RTA troops. The RTAF has 43,000 personnel, and the RTN has 50,000. There are also 18,500 *Thahan Phran*, a volunteer irregular force. Cited in *Military Balance*, London: Brassey's for International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 1990-1991 and 1991-1992. The RTA intends to prune its forces for greater efficiency, although the process has not yet begun.

⁶¹Bunbongkarn, Suchit, *The Military in Thai Politics*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987, pp. 62-75; interviews with U.S. Embassy and military personnel and with Dr. Suchit Bunbongkarn, Bangkok, June 1992. Dr. Suchit's discussion of the *taharn pran* (also spelled *thahan phran*) paramilitary organizations is of particular interest to this subject.

⁶²Interview with Major General Charn Boonprasert, commandant of the Army War College, Bangkok, June 1992. General Charn is a disciple of General Chaovalit, who developed the COIN strategy. He is also a member of Class 11. Dr. Suchit Bunbongkarn (1987, pp. 69-72) discusses the military's reference to dark influences.

⁶³Interview with Major General Charn Boonprasert, commandant of the Army War College, Bangkok, June 1992; Bunbongkarn, 1987, p. 71.

⁶⁴The Thai Ministry of Defense is made up completely of military personnel; there are no civilians as in the U.S. Department of Defense.

training the Thai military in civil-military relations would represent a giant step toward professionalization and would be both popular and useful.⁶⁵

Yet the IMET-E program is still in its infancy in Thailand. JUSMAGTHAI personnel said that as they become more involved in the selection of courses for Thai military students, they will promote IMET-E. They are concerned, however, that funding for IMET-E courses must come out of the total IMET funds for that country, in effect diminishing the number of non-IMET-E courses the country can select. Funding is clearly an issue for Thailand, which is already facing substantial cutbacks despite the reinstatement of IMET funds since the September 1992 elections.

Embassy staff, who would ideally promote IMET-E to Thai civilians, were not familiar with the program. The ambassador had not heard of it, and other Embassy personnel were not certain of the program's objectives. One staff member in the Political/Military Office, for example, thought that IMET-E was strictly intended for Ministry of Defense personnel.⁶⁶ Thus, although the program has clear application to the situation in Thailand, it is not yet sufficiently established.

Concluding Observations

Although the Thai military has become heavily involved in IDAD since the mid-1970s, U.S. training has played little, if any, role in such endeavors. Indeed, by mutual agreement with the Thais, U.S. training has been predominantly conventional since the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1975-1976. The Thai military's involvement in nation-building, moreover, although nominally undertaken in the name of democratization, appears to serve the interests of the military and individual military officers as much as the broader goal of internal development. Ongoing projects will be cancelled and new, higher profile projects begun as senior officers rotate through and seek to aggrandize their own contributions to rural development.⁶⁷ U.S. IDAD training under such circumstances could only have further promoted the military's usurpation of civilian responsibilities and power.

⁶⁵Interviews, Bangkok, June 1992.

⁶⁶Interviews with the ambassador, first secretary of the Embassy for political military affairs, and the assistant Army attaché to the Embassy, Bangkok, June 1992. When the ambassador learned what IMET-E is, he expressed doubt as to civilian interest in the courses.

⁶⁷Interviews with Dr. Suchit Bunbongkorn, Dean of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University and with a U.S. Army officer, Bangkok, June 1992; it must be cautioned that the author only had access to limited sources in the time available to her, and may therefore in some instances fail to present other existing points of view.

Training in the tenets of democracy, civil-military relations, military justice, and defense resource management,⁶⁸ on the other hand, would be helpful to both civilian and military personnel in Thailand. Thailand clearly fits Samuel Huntington's "cyclical model of despotism and democracy."⁶⁹ If the changes under former-Prime Minister Anand, which began to bring the military under civilian control, are to be continued and successful, the military must not only accept limitations on its role and acquiesce to civilian control, but the civilian government must inspire confidence and trust.

In the past, Thai civilian governments have been so corrupt that the public has been relieved when the military has stepped in to "clean things up." One foreign bureaucrat visiting Thailand remarked that "democratic government and clean government are presented as alternatives rather than complements."⁷⁰ Thai political scientist Kramol Thongthammachart wrote that Thai political parties have always been overshadowed by military intervention in government because they themselves have little understanding of the democratic system.⁷¹

Thailand is now being run by a prime minister who is considered honest, and the military's control over government and private enterprise is being challenged. It is precisely these kinds of changes that IMET-E is intended to support. Some senior Thai commanders have expressed interest in such training, and could clearly benefit from greater exposure to the skills and concepts required for democratization and improved civil-military relations. The fledgling IMET-E program in Thailand requires further development but finds itself in a fertile environment. The issue of IMET-E funding must be addressed, however. Selection of IMET-E courses involves sacrificing other courses, which, at a time when the overall number of Thais trained in the United States is declining, could be a problem. A requirement that nations sending international military students spend some portion of their IMET funds on IMET-E courses will suggest that the United States is more interested in exposing host-nation civilian and military personnel to U.S. values and ideals than in training them in military skills and developing close and cooperative military-to-military relationships. It would make IMET-E a price to pay for host nations, rather than an opportunity, and could breed bad blood between host nations and the United States.

⁶⁸Despite the May 1992 riots, the Thai military has a good reputation in human rights. Interview with U.S. Assistant Army Attaché to the U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, June 1992.

⁶⁹Huntington, Samuel P., "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 99, No. 2, Summer 1984, p. 210.

⁷⁰Cited in Wallace, Charles P., "Graft and Gunplay Herald Thai Election," *Los Angeles Times*, 17 March 1986.

⁷¹Cited in Handley, Paul, "Open to Offers," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 February 1992, pp. 16-17.

4. Philippines

History

Political Role of the Philippine Military

The Philippine military's involvement in politics has changed significantly since the Republic of the Philippines gained its independence from the United States on 4 July 1946. Although the military became actively involved in domestic politics prior to 1958, such involvement was undertaken at the behest of President Ramon Magsaysay as a means of restoring confidence in the democratic process while simultaneously combating the Huk rebellion. During that time, military officers held high national government posts as well as positions in the Luzon region's civilian government. During the presidencies of Carlos P. Garcia and Diosdado Macapagal, from 1953 to 1965, however, military involvement in civil affairs was considered a form of militarization and the military's political power was severely curtailed: Manpower and budgets were reduced, the government became actively involved in internal armed forces affairs, such as promotions and other personnel issues, civic action programs were scaled back, and the armed forces leadership no longer held high government positions.¹

Presidents Garcia and Macapagal were able to reverse the trend of military civil involvement in large part because the Philippine military had been strongly influenced by the U.S. colonial administration of the islands. Indeed, since the turn of the century, when colonial governor William Howard Taft set a powerful example by enforcing civilian control over General Arthur MacArthur, the commander in chief of the American Expeditionary Forces to the Philippines, the Philippine military had respected civilian authority.²

However, this situation changed markedly with Ferdinand E. Marcos' presidency and later dictatorship. Marcos, a former Army officer, was elected president in 1965 and held two terms (which was the constitutional limit). He

¹Bunge, Frederica J., ed., *Philippines: A Country Study*, Foreign Area Studies, The American University, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA Pam 550-72, 3rd ed., 1983, p. 252.

²Steinberg, David Joel, *The Philippines: A Singular and a Plural Place*, 2d ed., Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 126 and 154-155.

then declared martial law, after which he continued to rule until February 1986. Under Marcos, the military tripled in size, began to assume a larger role in national development, and again became involved in both national and local politics. During this same period, the military's combat efficiency was severely undermined, the leadership became involved in political corruption, and armed-forces operations became increasingly brutal.³

When Corazon Aquino took office in 1986, she was faced with a very different military than existed when Carlos Garcia became president almost 30 years earlier. During the 18-year Marcos era, military involvement in politics had become institutionalized; an entire generation of young officers had been trained under martial law. Aquino could not simply revoke the military's political privileges and send them back to the barracks, as had been done in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The military under Marcos had lost its commitment to civilian authority, and Aquino therefore had to develop a working relationship with the military, involving compromise and acknowledgment of the armed forces' *de facto* political power.

Yet Aquino had difficulty creating a balanced government: She appointed Marcos-era military leaders Juan Ponce Enrile and Fidel Ramos as secretary of defense⁴ and chief of staff, respectively, but then counterbalanced them with a number of long-time politicians, many of them former associates of her late husband. Such a structure set up a conflict not only between the two military leaders, but between the military and the civilians, who tended to be much farther to the left in their political views than their military counterparts and who held much different views regarding the appropriate means of dealing with the communist insurgency. Whereas the military believed that a military solution was necessary, the civilians leaned toward political and social solutions, such as amnesty—an imbalance that inevitably led to splits in the government. More to the point, the military felt threatened, resulting in numerous military coup attempts beginning as early as July 1986. Although Fidel Ramos proved loyal to the Aquino government, Juan Ponce Enrile openly challenged the government's

³At this point, the Reagan administration's highest priority in the Philippines was to address the military's structural weakness, lack of effective leadership, corruption, and mismanagement of resources. The administration's goal was the "restoration of professional apolitical leadership in the Armed Forces in order to deal with the NPA threat." NSSD: *U.S. Policy Towards the Philippines, Executive Summary*, undated draft of a Reagan administration interagency policy document released by the Philippine Support Committee, Washington, D.C., 12 March 1985, and cited in Porter, Gareth, *The Politics of Counterinsurgency in the Philippines: Military and Political Options*, Philippine Studies Occasional Paper No. 9, Center for Philippine Studies, Centers for Asian and Pacific Studies, Manoa, Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1987, p. 130.

⁴In the Philippines, the secretary of defense holds the number-two position of power, instead of the vice president. The secretary of defense is responsible for the day-to-day administration of the armed forces of the Philippines.

legitimacy. Aquino finally replaced Enrile with General Rafael Ileto, Enrile's former deputy and a former ambassador.⁵

The military continued to pose a threat to Aquino, who responded by demonstrating less interest in making deals with the insurgents and by becoming more supportive of the military's counterinsurgency operations. Nonetheless, a faction of the military launched another coup in August 1987. Several hundred troops and the entire cadet corps of the Philippine Military Academy were involved in the coup. Ramos was able to bring the situation under control, but only after 53 people were killed and hundreds injured. The military's move forced Aquino to accept the resignations of her closest civilian advisers, whom the military considered hostile to the army and its counterinsurgency efforts.

In January 1988, Fidel Ramos replaced General Ileto as secretary of defense and Aquino appointed Renato De Villa to the chief of staff position. The government attempted to appease the armed forces with substantial pay hikes and promotions. Again, Aquino's efforts were unsuccessful. In December 1989, another coup was attempted. This time 3,000 troops participated, many of them from among the elite armed forces.⁶ Despite U.S. intervention, the fighting lasted eight days: 95 people were killed and nearly 600 were wounded in the violence. Aquino's Vice-President Salvador Laurel called the coup attempt "democracy in its fullest and complete sense."⁷

Even though the coup attempts were unsuccessful, they demonstrated both the weakness of Aquino's government and the strength of the military. The president, criticized by both the left and the right for calling in U.S. military assistance, could not control a subsequent wave of brutal bombings throughout the country, and was unable even to discipline the rebel troops. Moreover, several attempts to arrest coup leaders failed embarrassingly.⁸

It thus appears that the political power the Philippine military accrued under Marcos will not easily be rescinded. Moreover, the military rebels may only be an extreme reflection of an attitudinal trend in the Philippine armed forces, according to testimony before the U.S. Congress in October 1990 by RADM Michael A. McDevitt, then-Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. RADM McDevitt noted that the February 1986 military

⁵Steinberg, 1990, p. 156.

⁶Steinberg, 1990, p. 159.

⁷Steinberg, 1990, p. 160.

⁸Amnesty International's 1992 report, *Philippines: The Killing Goes On*, New York: Amnesty International, notes that the military's dominance was proven and reinforced by the government's repeated political concessions.

revolt was unprecedented and had spawned a new military self-image, including new perceptions about how the military could or should contribute to the country's stability and internal development. McDevitt went on to suggest that the existence of the two military rebel groups—the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) and the Young Officers' Union (YOU)—are symptomatic of broader ideological changes in the military regarding its appropriate role in more directly addressing the Philippines' serious domestic problems.⁹

The Philippine military's perception of its role in national stability and development may thus be moving closer to that of the Thai military. Whether such a trend will continue under the new president, Fidel Ramos, will be of considerable interest. Ramos was the bulwark that repeatedly blocked the rebels during Aquino's administration. At a 1986 seminar about democratization, then-Chief of Staff Ramos stated that

a clearly enunciated new AFP policy is for men in uniform to steer clear of partisan politics, and to recognize civilian supremacy at all times.¹⁰

Whether he can—or chooses to—assert such civilian control over the military now that he is president may determine whether the Philippines can avoid the kind of cyclical despotism and democratization that has slowed Thailand's transition to civilian democracy.

Philippine Military Doctrine and Force Structure

The Philippine military traces its mandate back to the military forces of the revolutionary government, established in 1897, that fought against first Spanish, then U.S., rule. Although those forces were dissolved in the face of the superior American military, they continued to wage guerrilla warfare until 1903. When the United States took over the Philippines, it employed some Philippine forces alongside its own for external defense, and in 1901 it organized the Philippine Constabulary (PC) for internal defense. The PC was not strictly a police force but more of a paramilitary organization, with responsibilities spanning traditional civilian, military, and police tasks. When the Philippine Army was formally established in 1936, it took on some of the responsibilities formerly under the

⁹U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearing on Development in the Philippines*, 101st Congress, 2d Session, 3 October 1990, pp. 33–35.

¹⁰"Democratization of the Philippines," DC INFO, seminar on The Transition from Authoritarian Regimes to Democracy, Manila, 13–14 December 1986.

aegis of the PC.¹¹ General Douglas MacArthur was instrumental in organizing and training the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which he patterned closely on those of the United States¹²—a small professional force augmented by a much larger reserve force.

The AFP was initially externally oriented and fought against the Japanese invasion in 1941. When the Japanese defeated them, however, the forces broke down into individual units and set up an organized guerrilla resistance similar to that which had fought against U.S. domination 40 years earlier. Immediately following the war, when the Philippines was granted its independence, a communist insurgent group known as the Huks¹³ sought to overthrow the new republic. The newly regenerated Philippine Army was reorganized into a counterinsurgency force and was able to subdue the Huks by 1953, when it was again reorganized into a conventional force focused on external threats. A small contingent of the Philippine armed forces subsequently fought in Korea and, when the Muslim insurgency began on the southern island of Mindanao in 1972, the AFP began conducting extensive conventional operations against the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) forces.¹⁴

Unlike the Thai military, the Philippine armed forces use both conventional and more traditional counterinsurgency techniques to battle the various insurgencies. Indeed, virtually all Philippine combat units are engaged daily in either counterinsurgency operations against the communist New Peoples' Army (NPA) or conventional warfare against the MNLF.¹⁵ Like the RTARF, however, the AFP has focused on internal defense at the expense of its external defense capabilities.

With the withdrawal of the U.S. Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base, the Philippines will no longer be able to rely on the U.S. presence for security and must improve its external defense capabilities.¹⁶ The air force, for example, is

¹¹The PC continued to function until 1991, when it was subsumed under the new Philippine National Police (PNP).

¹²Bunge, 1983, pp. 250-252; U.S. Army Training Board, *Republic of the Philippines*, Allied Army Training Study, Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Army Training Board, 31 March 1989, p. 2.

¹³Huk is short for the Peoples' Liberation Army—Hukbong Mapagpalayang Bayan.

¹⁴Over that period of time, the AFP was first reduced and then, under Marcos, began to grow again. It was not until Marcos imposed martial law in 1972, however, that the AFP enjoyed its most major expansion in numbers and power. U.S. Army Training Board, 1989, pp. 2-3.

¹⁵U.S. Army Training Board, 1989, p. 7; verified in discussion with COL Leo Alves, Commander, Philippine Special Forces, Santa Monica, Calif., 1 October 1992.

¹⁶Written interview with COL Richard H. Taylor, Chief, JUSMAG, Philippines, Manila, 12 May 1992. COL Taylor suggested that the AFP has been more dependent on the United States than either military cares to admit, and stated that the Philippines will need substantial assistance in order to develop its conventional defense capabilities to an acceptable level. Twenty years ago, the General Accounting Office (GAO) determined that it was potentially problematic that the Philippine government was devoting very limited financial resources to building its military force, under the

gearing future defense planning toward potential external sources of trouble, such as the Spratly Islands or an aggressive China.¹⁷ For a military already suffering extreme budget shortfalls and involved in daily internal combat, this new responsibility will be costly and difficult to achieve. It will require the purchase of appropriate weapons and materiel, training for proficiency on the new equipment, a new focus in doctrine and training, and the reconfiguration of scarce units for external defense.

The Philippines' current emphasis on counterinsurgency and civic action operations is born of necessity in the face of ongoing insurgencies. Its neglect of external defense, furthermore, is a result of its long-standing reliance on the U.S. presence. Indeed, the Philippine military has made serious efforts to modernize and improve its doctrine and training. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Education and Training (J-8), established in January 1988, is a case in point. It is charged with instituting, organizing, coordinating, supervising, and evaluating AFP training, and developing and disseminating doctrine. Resource limitations have slowed efforts in this direction, however.¹⁸

Finally, disaster relief is a major mission compounding the strain on the Philippine military. In the last two years, the military has dealt with the aftermaths of the 16 July 1990 earthquake in Central Luzon, the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the summer of 1991, the resulting—and devastating—mudflows during the rainy season, the deadly flood at Ormoc, Leyte, that killed 8,000 people in a single afternoon, and, finally, the ruinous typhoon that followed shortly thereafter.

Thus, like the Thai military, the Philippine military clearly has responsibilities across the operational continuum, including disaster relief, civic action and other internal development measures, counterinsurgency, internal conventional operations, and, now, the development of external conventional capabilities. In contrast with the Thai military, the Philippine armed forces are apparently interested in further developing their doctrine and training to guide these various efforts; however, financial constraints prevent making much headway.

assumption that the United States would go to the Philippines' assistance were the country to be attacked. See Comptroller General of the United States, Report to Congress, *Military Assistance and Commitments in the Philippines*, Washington, D.C.: Comptroller General of the United States, B-133359, 12 April 1973.

¹⁷"Volcanic Damage to Philippine Aircraft Imperils Anti-Insurgent Operations," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 13 April 1992, pp. 60-61.

¹⁸U.S. Army Training Board, 1989, pp. 8 and 11-12.

U.S. Interests and Efforts in the Philippines

In March 1947, the United States and the Philippines ratified the Military Bases Agreement, which granted the United States a 99-year lease on 23 military installations including Clark Air Base and the naval facilities at Subic Bay. In the same month, the two nations signed the Military Assistance Agreement, establishing JUSMAG Philippines and authorizing the transfer of substantial amounts of military aid and materiel from the United States to the Philippines. Then, in August 1951, the Mutual Defense Treaty between the two countries was signed.¹⁹ Despite the formal cooperation, many in the Philippines resented the terms of these and other nonmilitary agreements, and felt that the United States was perpetuating its historical control over the former colony by forcing it to accede to unfair provisions.

Forty years later, the same resentment resulted in the Philippine Senate's vote to terminate the U.S. lease on Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base and to call for a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines by December 1992. Despite overwhelming popular support for continuation of the treaties, plus promises of U.S. economic and military aid for the duration of the proposed 10-year arrangement, the Philippine Senate rejected any renegotiation of the Military Bases Agreement on the basis that a continued U.S. colonial presence was unacceptable.²⁰

The discontinuation of the leases, compounded by the effects of the overall shrinkage of the U.S. foreign aid budget, resulted in a significant reduction of U.S. military and financial aid to the Philippines. In 1991, total U.S. foreign assistance to the Philippines came to more than \$455 million; in 1992, the total was \$397 million. After the Philippine Senate rejected the new lease agreement negotiated by Presidents Bush and Aquino, the total proposed foreign assistance for 1993 came to only \$156 million—a 61-percent reduction from that of the previous year. This level of funding will assist the AFP in maintaining equipment it already possesses but will not enable it to purchase more.²¹ Such a reduction will have enormous consequences, considering the pressing requirements of the Philippine military.

¹⁹Under the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, the United States and the Philippines are each committed to taking action in the event of an external armed attack on the other. The agreement does not, however, specify the nature of that action, nor does the United States have any specific forces or equipment dedicated to the defense of the Philippines.

²⁰Tasker, Rodney, "Sour Leave-Taking: Wrangle over Navy Facilities Mars U.S. Withdrawal," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 30 April 1992, p. 19.

²¹U.S. Congress, *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs*, Washington, D.C., 1991, 1992, and 1993.

International Military Education and Training

In light of the withdrawal of the U.S. bases from the Philippines, U.S. training of Philippine military students is more, not less, important. That increased importance is reflected in the request for IMET funds submitted in the *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs* for 1993. However, while U.S. economic and military assistance are being substantially reduced in 1993, IMET dollars are being only marginally trimmed (see Table 4.1).²²

On the other hand, since the withdrawal of the U.S. bases from the Philippines, over 250 on-the-job training (OJT) courses formerly conducted at Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base will have to be absorbed into the formal CONUS training program. Whereas OJT used to be a cheap and easily accessible training opportunity, it will now compete for the annual IMET funds. Moreover, extended IMET (IMET-E) funding will come from the general IMET funds, further limiting the numbers of non-IMET-E courses the Philippines will be able to afford. Some of this burden will be offset by the reassignment of dollars and training quotas from the PC to the military services,²³ but this reassignment cannot compensate for the reduction completely.

Funding is a very serious issue for the AFP. In comparison with Thailand, which suffers a surplus of students waiting to take the limited number of seats allocated in U.S. courses, the numbers of Philippine students sent for CONUS training are limited by the Philippine government's ability to pay expenses for each student.

Table 4.1
IMET as a Portion of Total Military Assistance
(in \$ thousands), by Year

| | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 |
|--------------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| Total foreign assistance | 455,440 | 397,112 | 156,397 |
| Military assistance | 200,000 | 200,000 | 45,000 |
| IMET | 2,600 | 2,800 | 2,450 |

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs*, FYs 1991, 1992, and 1993.

²²Military assistance includes foreign military financing and IMETP. See the annual U.S. Congress *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs*.

²³The PC has been subsumed by the Philippine National Police, as have the narcotics command and the integrated national police. The PNP is under the jurisdiction of the department of the interior rather than the department of defense, so Foreign Military Sales (FMS) funding is completely cancelled and IMET funding ended 30 May 1992. Telephone interviews with LTC Thomas Broz, former chief of training, JUSMAG Philippines, Manila, 14 July 1992, and LTC Charles Krueger Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command, Hawaii, 15 July 1992.

Although the United States pays the travel and living allowance (TLA) for the Philippine students, the Philippine Department of Defense still pays what it calls "counterpart" funds, which pay for expenses not met by TLA. Such funds are in short supply and severely circumscribe the numbers of students who can study in the United States.²⁴

IMET training for the Philippines is intended to allow the United States to

- retain contact and influence with the Philippine military in the absence of the day-to-day relationship that existed prior to the base withdrawal;
- uphold its R.P.-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty responsibilities;
- ensure that the Philippine military is competent and compatible with the United States' military;
- maximize joint training and interoperability as outlined in the East Asian Strategy Initiative; and
- continue to support democracy and human rights in the Philippines.²⁵

To that end, Philippine troops have been trained in a variety of courses. Between 1988 and 1991, the U.S. Army courses most attended by Filipinos, with a total of 10 or more Philippine attendees over the four-year period, are listed in Table 4.2.

Upon completion of their U.S. training, Philippine military personnel are required to spend two to three years training their counterparts in the skills they acquired in the United States. Ideally, this practice should result in a completely independent Philippine training capability. In reality, however, the need for qualified personnel in the field takes precedence over instruction. Moreover, the Philippines simply cannot afford to provide the same quality of training that the United States provides.

Basic training aids and equipment are in short supply, to say nothing of more technically advanced training equipment, and training facilities are in poor condition. Nonetheless, the AFP's training program development is progressing, various equipment needs have been identified, and training workshops are being conducted to help develop the most efficient and effective possible overall training program.²⁶

²⁴Telephone interviews with JUSMAG Philippines training branch personnel, 13 July 1992.

²⁵LTC Thomas Broz, *FY 93-94 Philippines Two-Year Training Plan*, JUSMAG Philippines, February 1992, p. 9.

²⁶Broz, 1992, p. 11.

Table 4.2
Most-Attended U.S. Army Courses, Philippine Troops

| Course | No. of Students (1989-91) |
|---|---------------------------|
| Instructor Training (various courses) | 97 |
| Allied Officer Preparation—Infantry Officer | |
| Advanced | 48 |
| Infantry Officer Advanced | 47 |
| Specialized English Language Training | 40 |
| Small Arms Repair | 26 |
| <i>Ranger</i> | 26 |
| Quartermaster Officer Advanced | 26 |
| <i>International Intelligence Officer Basic</i> | 24 |
| Supply and Service Management Officer* | 22 |
| Radio Repairer* | 22 |
| Personnel Management Specialist* | 22 |
| Unit Supply Specialist | 19 |
| <i>Psychological Operations Unit Officer</i> | 19 |
| Platoon Leader Development Course— | |
| Non-Commissioned Officer Academy | 19 |
| <i>Civil Affairs</i> | 19 |
| <i>Basic Journalist</i> | 18 |
| <i>Military Police Officer Advanced</i> | 16 |
| Materiel Handling and Storage Specialist | 16 |
| Software Analyst* | 15 |
| Psychological Officer | 15 |
| <i>International Officer Preparation</i> | 15 |
| <i>Command and General Staff Officer</i> | 15 |
| <i>Apprentice Criminal Investigation Division</i> | |
| <i>Special Agent</i> | 15 |
| Signal Officer Advanced Preparation— | |
| International Officer | 14 |
| Signal Officer Advanced | 14 |
| Defense Inventory Management* | 14 |
| Operations Research System Analysis | |
| Military Application I | 13 |
| <i>Transportation Officer Advanced</i> | 12 |
| <i>Public Affairs Officer</i> | 12 |
| <i>Observer Med/Health/Hygiene—CONUS</i> | 12 |
| Branch Automation Officer* | 12 |
| <i>Special Formal Training—Military Police</i> | 11 |
| Technical Ammunition | 10 |
| On-the-job Administrative Training— | |
| CONUS* | 10 |
| <i>Army Maintenance Management</i> | 10 |

SOURCE: *Country Training Extract, Philippines, by Country, School, Course per FY*, Security Assistance Training Field Agency (SATFA), 1992.

NOTE: The italicized courses are of particular utility to internal defense and development. The asterisked courses have carryover potential for building up human capital in skills useful for internal development.

Between 1950 and 1990, the United States trained 20,711 Philippine military students. The career length of U.S.-trained Philippine military personnel varies more than that of their Thai counterparts. Although the AFP contractually requires five years of service following U.S. training, personnel may remain in the military as few as two years or until retirement age.²⁷ In most cases, military students trained in technical skills will have somewhat shorter military careers because they can earn substantially higher salaries working for Saudi Arabian and other foreign businesses. Those students trained in professional and management skills are more likely to have longer military careers, ranging, on average, between 20 and 30 years.²⁸ Even if one assumes an average military career length to be between 10 and 20 years, the United States had trained 4-6 percent of the entire 1990 AFP (see Table 4.3).²⁹

Measures of Influence

Yet, as in Thailand, numbers trained do not adequately represent the effectiveness of U.S. training in the Philippines. The same three multipliers obtain:

- U.S.-trained officers train their counterparts upon their return from the United States;

Table 4.3
Percentage of AFP Officers with In-CONUS U.S. Training,
by Length of Career

| Year | Length of Career (yr) | | | |
|------|-----------------------|-----|----|----|
| | 5 | 10 | 20 | 30 |
| 1965 | 12 | 19 | 23 | 23 |
| 1975 | 1 | 4 | 11 | 13 |
| 1985 | 1 | 1.5 | 5 | 10 |
| 1990 | 2.5 | 4 | 6 | 15 |

SOURCE: *Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military Assistance Facts*, Washington, D.C.: Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), Comptroller, Data Management Division, annual.

²⁷ Preliminary telephone interview with LTC Thomas Broz, Chief, Joint Training Branch, JUSMAG Philippines, Manila, May 1992.

²⁸ Telephone interviews with JUSMAG Philippines training branch personnel, 13 July 1992.

²⁹ This average could be low. LTC Charles Krueger suggests that most U.S.-trained Philippine military students are careerists. He points out that they are very carefully selected for their long-term potential. Telephone interview, LTC Charles Krueger, HQ USPACOM, 15 July 1992.

- The U.S. trains a disproportionate number of leaders; and
- The training conducted by the Philippine military relies heavily on U.S. doctrine, training manuals, and equipment.

U.S.-Trained Officers Become Trainers. Upon their return, the graduates of foreign training are generally assigned as trainers in the Philippine training command in accordance with U.S. regulations regarding appropriate utilization of U.S.-trained students.³⁰

Students are supposed to act as instructors for two to three years before being placed in other positions appropriate to their training. The JUSMAG verifies that returning students are appropriately placed by debriefing them upon their return to the Philippines from U.S. training; it then follows up on their careers over the next three years with information provided by the AFP.³¹ Unlike JUSMAGTHAI, the Philippines JUSMAG does not intend to independently confirm the utilization of U.S.-trained military personnel. Not only are they satisfied that the AFP provides accurate information, but they argue that there is not sufficient JUSMAG staffing to undertake such an effort. Furthermore, they question whether the Philippines would allow independent U.S. verification.³²

Nonetheless, many returning students do not perform as instructors because they are so urgently needed in the field. U.S.-trained troops may therefore provide very little instruction before returning to combat. Those students who are able to fulfill their instruction requirements will, as in Thailand, develop their own courses and use their retainable instruction materials (RIM) as training manuals. Their efforts are handicapped, however, by the inadequate training facilities and insufficient training materials available to them. Unlike the Thais, for example, the Filipinos have not developed basic courses that the U.S. deems adequate for preparing Filipinos for advanced instruction in the United States. Many times, Philippine military students who have taken basic training in the Philippines will have to repeat it in the United States as a prerequisite for taking a U.S. advanced course.³³

U.S. Trains Potential Leaders. Only 2 percent of AFP officers come from foreign schools and/or direct commissions. The other 98 percent are trained at the

³⁰Broz, 1992, p. 8.

³¹Telephone interviews with JUSMAG Philippines training branch personnel, 13 July 1992.

³²Telephone interview, LTC Thomas Broz, former Chief of Training, JUSMAG Philippines, 14 July 1992.

³³This is true despite the fact that Philippine officers have an immense advantage over their Thai counterparts: Their entire education has been in English, whereas the Thais must learn English to qualify for training in the United States.

Philippine Military Academy (PMA), the Citizen Military Training (CMT; formerly ROTC), and Officers Candidate School (OCS).³⁴ Nonetheless, many of the highest ranking Philippine officers are U.S.-trained, indicating the significance of U.S. training. The Philippine selection process for candidates for U.S. study is rigorous: Only the top students are chosen, both as a reward and in consideration of the long-term development of the military. The new President of the Republic of the Philippines Fidel Ramos, for example, is a West Point graduate. Aquino's Chief of Staff General Lisandro Abadia, AFP, and Director General Nazareno, PNP, also received U.S. training, as did Major General Louvin Abadia of the Philippine Air Force and Lieutenant General Flores, the AFP Vice Chief of Staff under Aquino.³⁵ The heads of each of the armed services under Aquino were graduates of U.S. training, as well.

Philippine Military Uses U.S. Doctrine and Training Manuals. Training within the Philippine military is strongly influenced by U.S. doctrine and training practices. The Philippine Military Academy is patterned after West Point, and other Philippine training institutions have adopted elements of the U.S. curriculum and use U.S. training and field manuals as the basis of their instruction. However, U.S. training materials are often outdated, and are found in limited supply and only at central training institutions.³⁶ The former chief of training for the Philippines JUSMAG claimed that he received requests for U.S. training materials from the first day of his assignment to the last.³⁷

Such materials do not adequately address the specific threats faced by the AFP. Therefore—and in contrast to the Thai armed forces—the Philippine military is attempting to develop its own appropriate doctrine and training manuals. Thus, in January 1988, the AFP reorganized its training and doctrine structure to include a separate staff element comparable to the United States' Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The new office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of Education and Training (J-8) is responsible for doctrinal development and training management, including the allocation of foreign school spaces among the services.

Economic impediments have slowed the J-8's progress, however. Funds are inadequate for reproducing training and doctrinal literature for all the units and

³⁴U.S. Army Training Board, 1989, p. 15.

³⁵Major General Abadia will be inducted into the Air University Hall of Fame in the near future, and Lieutenant General Flores was inducted in absentia into the Leavenworth Hall of Fame.

³⁶U.S. Army Training Board, 1989, p. 11.

³⁷Telephone interview with LTC Thomas Broz, former Chief of Training, JUSMAG Philippines, 14 July 1992.

institutions that require it.³⁸ All the major service training facilities in the Philippines continue to suffer from inadequate and/or insufficient training aids, technical orders, manuals, student study guides, classroom handouts, diagrams, worksheets, training ammunition, classrooms, and all other training support facilities.³⁹

Nonetheless, in November 1989 the AFP published its "AFP Education and Training Philosophy" pamphlet to serve as the capstone manual for all AFP central and satellite training institutions. For fighting the insurgencies, the AFP also adopted the "Campaign Strategy," a tactical strategy proposing a policy of "gradual constriction" using intelligence, civil-military operations, and combat operations. This doctrine, like the Thais' COIN doctrine, is independently derived and distinct from U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine.

Internal Defense and Development, and Democratization

Like the Thai armed forces, the Philippine military has developed its own approach to counterinsurgency, making U.S. training in COIN and other forms of internal defense largely inappropriate to Philippine needs. However, U.S. training efforts in the last few years have placed increasing emphasis on the Philippine military's tactical COIN skills.

The United States does train Philippine military students in nation-building skills and actively promotes internal development operations.⁴⁰ Each year, for example, the United States gives the Philippines economic support funds (ESF) to support rural and agricultural development, thereby helping to reduce the appeal of the insurgencies.⁴¹ During the Vietnam War, when President Marcos was rapidly increasing the military's civic action mission, the United States rewarded the Philippines for its dispatch of a Civic Action Group to Vietnam with approximately \$16 million in engineering and construction equipment.⁴² The Department of Defense supported this policy by stating that it would "contribute to [the Philippines'] internal security and civic action programs, both of which, in turn, would contribute to long-standing U.S. objectives in the

³⁸U.S. Army Training Board, 1989, pp. 8-11.

³⁹Broz, 1992, p. 2.

⁴⁰Telephone interviews with LTC Thomas Broz and LTC Charles Krueger, , 14 and 15 July 1992, respectively.

⁴¹U.S. Congress, *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs*, annual.

⁴²Among other things, including direct cash.

Philippines.⁴³ More recently, following the natural disasters in the Philippines, the United States made engineering equipment available to the Philippine military under the Humanitarian Assistance Program and under 506(A) presidential drawdown authority. That equipment is now being put to use building roads and improving transportation capabilities.⁴⁴

The training contribution to this effort has been less conspicuous. Most training in civic action, for example, is conducted through joint-combined exercises, such as those held annually at Balikpapan. The JUSMAG Philippines does suggest to the Philippine military that international military students take courses in engineering and other nation-building skills, such as medicine and communications, when it is clear that the Philippine military has such a requirement.⁴⁵ Thus, between 1988 and 1991, 123 Philippine army personnel were trained either in medical or engineering skills in the United States, and another 12 students were trained in transportation skills. Philippine army students also took courses in logistics, management, public affairs, journalism, accounting and resource management, military policing, computer skills, law, psychological operations, and advanced officer courses. In all, such courses represented 33 percent of all training provided by the U.S. Army to Philippine military students.⁴⁶ This is not to say that 33 percent of all training provided to the Philippine military in those four years was IDAD oriented; but 33 percent was clearly IDAD applicable.

Whereas such training is problematic in Thailand because it may prepare the military to compete head-to-head with the private sector, the opposite problem occurs in the Philippines: U.S. technical training provides low-paid Philippine troops with the opportunity for obtaining much higher salaries outside the military. Many technicians therefore retire early from the military to work in private corporations. Moreover, because foreign corporations can pay higher

⁴³Comptroller General of the United States, *Military Assistance and Commitments in the Philippines*, Report to the Congress, Washington, D.C.: Comptroller General of the United States, B-133359, 12 April 1973.

⁴⁴Written interview with COL Richard H. Taylor, Chief, JUSMAG Philippines, Manila, 12 May 1992.

⁴⁵Unlike JUSMAGTHAI, the JUSMAG Philippines is actively involved in the Philippine military's course-selection process. The constantly changing requirements of the Philippine military make resubmitting the same standard training list each year impossible. There is thus an active interchange between the AFP and the JUSMAG Philippines to determine which courses are most needed at any given time. Telephone interview with LTC Thomas Broz, 14 July 1992.

⁴⁶*Country Training Extract by Country, School, and Course per FY*, provided by SATFA, Va., 24 July 1992. The courses were categorized by the author with help from an Army officer familiar with course contents. The categorizations are illustrative rather than definitive. The U.S. Army provides the bulk of training to the Philippines. Although both the U.S. Air Force and Navy offer significant training, Army figures provide a fair representation of the kinds of training the Philippines received from the United States.

salaries and have higher demand for such skills than Philippine businesses, Filipinos tend to emigrate. Although such emigration results in significant financial remittances to the Philippines each year, it also prevents the Philippines from using U.S. training to build up its domestic technical capabilities.⁴⁷

Finally, civic action efforts cannot outweigh the political damage caused by the military's human-rights abuses. Whereas civic action is intended to win the hearts and minds of the people by providing them with improved transportation and facilities, human-rights abuses threaten people's very lives, destroy families, and generate hatred and fear. The worst human-rights abuses occur in the areas where the military and insurgents are in direct confrontation, and are committed by both sides. The Philippine military has thus justified its own abuses of human rights by claiming that they are no worse than those perpetrated by the insurgents. Although President Aquino rejected this argument and announced her intention to prosecute military human-rights abusers, she was forced to back down under intense pressure from her military, which argued that to prosecute the military while giving amnesty to the insurgents was to send the wrong message and subscribe to a dangerous double standard.⁴⁸

Human rights is one of the issues that IMET-E is intended to address. Whether there would be interest in the Philippines for an IMET-E human-rights course is not yet known. As of 1992,⁴⁹ no IMET-E training had been scheduled in the Philippines, but the AFP has already requested two seats in the Defense Resource Management Course at Monterey for 1993.⁵⁰ JUSMAG personnel are discussing the program with the AFP services. Although the training officers express interest in IMET-E courses, they are concerned that such courses must be paid for out of general IMET funds. This concern is all the more significant given that the allocation of \$2.4 million for 1993 fell from 1992's \$2.8 million—a small dip

⁴⁷This tends to be more true for Filipinos trained as air force or naval technicians. Helicopter technicians are most often cited. Nonetheless, students trained in any technical skill can usually make more money outside the military. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has hired thousands of Filipino technicians, many of them U.S.-trained, in a variety of fields. Telephone interviews with JUSMAG Philippines personnel, 12 July 1992; telephone interview with LTC Charles Krueger, HQ USPACOM, 15 July 1992.

⁴⁸While the U.S. Congress applauded President Aquino's actions in support of human rights, there is some evidence that U.S. President Ronald Reagan agreed with the Philippine military. *Philippines: The Killing Goes On*, New York: Amnesty International, 1992; "The Situation of Human Rights and Democratic Reconstruction in the Philippines," DC INFO, Human Rights, No. 4, 1 September 1991; Porter, 1987, p. 137.

⁴⁹The Philippine Air Force did send a civilian officer for training in a CONUS financial resource course in 1992, but his attendance at the course was funded under the general IMET program, not IMET-E.

⁵⁰If extra funding shows up for the end of the year, the two courses at Monterey could be funded out of 1992 general IMET funds.

relative to the overall reduction in financial assistance to the Philippines, but 14 percent fewer IMET dollars is a substantial amount for such a small program.⁵¹

It is clear, however, that issues of civil-military relations, human rights, and defense resource management are pertinent to the situation in the Philippines, where the military—especially rebel groups like RAM and YOU—is showing increased interest in politics, human-rights abuses continue to drive people into the arms of the insurgents, and the defense resources are so limited that such things as training manuals and basic equipment are in short supply. On the other hand, as the Philippines faces increasing responsibility for its own external defense and the insurgencies show no sign of abating, it appears unlikely that the military will choose to channel declining IMET funds into IMET-E instead of into tactical, technical, and professional training to help it combat the many threats it faces.

Concluding Observations

Although internal defense and development are important missions for the Philippine military, only one-third of U.S. training provided to the Philippines between 1988 and 1991 was applicable to these areas. On the one hand, the AFP has developed its own COIN strategy and therefore requires little internal defense training from the United States; on the other hand, although the United States provided substantial financial support and equipment for rural development activities prior to the forced withdrawal of its bases, actual training in civic action is mostly limited to joint-combined exercises. The JUSMAG Philippines, nonetheless, includes nation-building as one of the goals supported by U.S. training.

It is clear that both the Philippine government and military could benefit from exposure to the theoretical and practical issues IMET-E is intended to address. Democracy remains tenuous in the Philippines in the aftermath of Marcos' "presidency": The government is still riddled with corruption, and democratic institutions continue to be misused. Moreover, the Philippine military has lost its traditional respect for civilian authority, continues to perpetrate brutal human-rights abuses, and has failed to stamp out the two insurgencies that have plagued the country for more than 20 years. Finally, the Philippines' internal and external defense efforts are threatened by the country's persistent lack of financial resources and would benefit from improved defense resource management.

⁵¹Telephone interview with MSG Nick Canor, JUSMAG Philippines, 15 July 1992.

The JUSMAG Philippines is successfully promoting IMET-E to the AFP, which has expressed interest in such courses. However, the AFP has indicated that it will not feel free to select IMET-E courses as long as they must be financed out of the general IMET funds. Technical and tactical training will continue to take precedence over such courses, especially given the decline in IMET funds in 1993, the Philippines' new need for external defense capabilities, and the ongoing counterinsurgency efforts. Like Thailand, the Philippines provides a fertile environment for IMET-E but cannot afford to sacrifice more traditional courses for such training. And, as in Thailand, for the United States to require that the Philippines use some of its limited IMET funds for IMET-E can only be expected to breed resentment, thus undermining one of the fundamental goals of the IMET program: cooperative and mutually beneficial military-to-military and government-to-government relations.

5. Comparing the Two Cases

U.S. Interests and Efforts

Thailand and the Philippines have both assumed strategic significance to the United States: Both countries have allowed the United States to base troops on their soil, both have defense agreements with the United States, and both rely heavily on the United States for equipment, materiel, and other defense resources. U.S. training is a mark of prestige in each country, and U.S. doctrine and training manuals are the basis for each country's own training.

U.S. relations with the Philippines could not overcome the shadow of colonialism, however. Despite cooperative arrangements and a mutual defense treaty, tension has characterized the relationship between the two countries, eventually leading the Philippine Senate to demand the withdrawal of the last two U.S. military bases in the Philippines by December 1992. Even the base withdrawal was tinged with acrimony: Then-President Corazon Aquino requested that the U.S. Navy leave behind one of the three floating docks used at Subic Bay; the United States refused on the grounds that U.S. law precluded offering removable equipment to the Philippines as long as it was still required by a U.S. agency.¹

The base removal will have a significant effect on the Philippine military: It has already resulted in a dramatic reduction of U.S. military and economic support and has meant the loss of 40,000 Philippine jobs at Clark and Subic Bay in the volcano-devastated Luzon region. Although the United States will help the Philippine military maintain existing equipment, it has not offered sufficient Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits—upon which the financially strapped Philippine military has depended—for the Philippines to buy new equipment. More of the Philippines' military funds and resources will have to be spent on external defense, leaving less for internal defense despite the ongoing communist and Muslim insurgencies. It is likely that fewer joint exercises will be held with the Philippines now that the bases have been withdrawn, and the inexpensive on-the-job-training (OJT) provided at the bases is no longer possible, either.

¹Tasker, Rodney, "Sour Leave-Taking: Wrangle over Navy Facilities Mars U.S. Withdrawal," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 30 April 1992, p. 19.

Moreover, although IMET funds have not been reduced by as much as other financial and military support, they have still been trimmed by 14 percent. The Philippines are therefore faced with more training requirements and fewer training funds.

In contrast, U.S. relations with Thailand are more positive. Despite the May 1992 violence in Bangkok and the suspension of U.S. security assistance between the February 1991 coup and the September 1992 elections, the United States maintains a positive image and working relationship not only with the Thai military but with the civilian government and public, as well. Indeed, U.S. military assistance resumed immediately following the elections in the fall of 1992. Even when IMET funds were suspended, moreover, Thailand continued buying U.S. arms and military equipment and Thai military personnel paid their own way to the United States for observation tours.²

The single concern is that the declining numbers of Thai military students trained in the United States, while without significant short-term implications for the U.S.-Thai relationship, will have implications for 20 years down the road, when this generation of military students begins to enter the Thai leadership without the professional and emotional ties to the United States that the current leadership possesses.

Internal Defense and Development

Internal defense and development play an important role in both Thailand and the Philippines. The Thai military has taken full advantage of its IDAD mission, claiming that the fight against communist insurgents is still in its last stages, despite the virtual end of the insurgency in the mid-1980s. By continuing to "fight communism," the RTARF has justified involvement in domestic politics, maintained a presence nationwide, and continued to expand its nation-building role. The Thai military has thus been capable not only of maintaining the status quo but of broadening its mission at a time when Thailand is facing neither internal nor external threats.

The Philippine military, on the other hand, is combating ongoing insurgencies and is suddenly responsible for defining, and preparing for, the Philippines' external defense. Internal defense and development are not merely a justification for forces in the Philippines but a means of guaranteeing the republic's continued survival. Unfortunately, many of the efforts the military makes in internal

²Interview with Deputy Chief of Mission Victor Tomseth, U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, June 1992.

defense and development are offset by the military's brutal human-rights abuses, which tend to generate both active and passive support for the various insurgents.

The United States does not train many Thai or Philippine military students in IDAD-related skills. Both the AFP and the RTARF have overtly rejected U.S. COIN doctrine and have independently developed their own COIN strategies, making U.S. training in internal defense inappropriate. Nor has the United States provided undue amounts of internal development training to either country. Although the Philippines have in the past received substantial economic-support funds for rural and agricultural development, civic action training was mostly limited to joint-combined exercises, and training in technical skills appropriate to nation-building was not a priority. In Thailand, as well, most civic action training takes place as part of joint exercises, and the Thais have developed adequate in-country training capabilities in internal development skills, such as engineering and communications. Both countries prefer to use the limited IMET funds they receive for financing mostly conventional training in skills, concepts, and capabilities that they can receive only in the United States.

Democratization

Both the Philippines and Thailand could benefit from improved civil-military relations. In Thailand, the military has dominated the government since the coup that overthrew the monarchy in 1932, and, despite recent setbacks, the RTARF retains real political and economic power. Thai civilian governments, furthermore, have been routinely corrupt and incompetent, making military intervention a politically expedient option.

As the Thai middle class grows, however, Thais are beginning to demand real democracy with real political representation of their interests. These new attitudes led to the May 1992 demonstrations and riots and to the political changes in their aftermath. The situation in Thailand remains extremely volatile, although there is a consensus that the events of May 1992 represented a watershed in the Thai political system. Although the military retains a significant amount of political and economic control in Thailand, it has come under increased public scrutiny and is confronting pressure for change.

The Philippine military, in contrast, had a 60-year tradition of respect for civilian authority before Ferdinand E. Marcos began to subvert that tradition by bringing military leaders into his government and involving them in its corruption. When Marcos declared martial law in 1972, he changed the course of the AFP's

development: It grew quickly but became inefficient and ineffectual. Moreover, an entire generation of officers was trained under martial law.

The overthrow of the Marcos government could not have been accomplished without the support of much of the military. But AFP participation in that action further defined its new self-image. Some senior Philippine commanders realized that the AFP could be actively involved in solving the Philippines' political problems. Placed in high government positions, responsible for the daily counterinsurgency efforts against the communists and the Muslims, AFP leaders began to exert pressure on then-President Corazon Aquino. Although the more radical military factions instigated the numerous coup attempts during Aquino's presidency, the military in general appeared to be sympathetic to such attempts—a complete reversal in attitude from the pre-Marcos Philippine military.

The intent behind IMET-E training is to address precisely such issues at their civilian and military roots. At this time, the National Defense University is in the process of developing a course specifically on the subject of civil-military relations. Thai and Philippine military and civilian personnel have expressed interest in such training, as well as in other IMET-E courses, such as the defense resources management course. Particularly pertinent to the Philippine military would be training in human-rights issues from a practical—not a moralistic—standpoint. Such training is foreseen under IMET-E; at present, human-rights issues are addressed indirectly in a variety of U.S. military courses.

The clear problem confronting IMET-E is financial: IMET-E is currently funded out of general IMET dollars, and both the Philippines and Thailand are facing *reduced* IMET budgets and *higher* demands for courses. Although the two countries have expressed theoretical interest in IMET-E, barring a separate pot of money for such courses, it is unlikely that either the AFP or the RTARF will sacrifice more practical training in tactics and technical skills for IMET-E courses. Indeed, requiring the AFP and the RTARF to pay for IMET-E courses out of their general IMET allocations can be expected not only to frustrate and anger them—especially as they watch IMET funds going to civilians—but will further burden the IMET program itself. It would not be surprising if both the AFP and the RTARF began to turn to other providers of military training or to rely more extensively on their own training. Both IMET and IMET-E deserve adequate funding, especially given the relatively small number of dollars actually required.³

³The total annual budget for IMET falls near \$47 million.

6. Conclusion: IMET Training, Development, and Democratization—Success or Failure?

Although international military education and training is a very small program with a very small budget, it has an impact beyond its size. Not easily quantified in terms of dollars and cents, the success of IMET lies in the prestige and quality of U.S. training that motivate foreign countries to send their best and brightest military students to courses in the United States. The United States has the opportunity to expose friendly and allied nations' future leaders to the U.S. system and culture, thus generating mutual understanding and durable working relationships. Such exposure may not translate into direct influence—in neither the Philippines nor Thailand could it be said that the military in general behaves consistently with U.S. ideals, despite U.S.-trained leaders—but at the very least it provides a common language (literally and figuratively) for negotiations.

IMET's influence is extended when foreign students return home and train their counterparts in the skills and concepts they learned in the United States. Such training occurs less frequently in Thailand and the Philippines than either these countries or the United States might wish; however, because of the demand for highly skilled, U.S.-trained military personnel, when such training occurs, it serves to multiply the effects of IMET and familiarize foreign military personnel who have never been trained by the United States with U.S. methodologies and doctrine.

The effects of U.S.-trained foreign military personnel acting as instructors is augmented by their use of retainable instructional materials (RIM) as manuals in the courses they conduct. Indeed, both the AFP and the RTARF rely on U.S. doctrine and training manuals for most of their in-country training. Unfortunately, the manuals are often in short supply, outdated, and/or inappropriate for the specific needs of the militaries. By steering foreign military students toward the most useful and appropriate courses, the JUSMAGs in Thailand and the Philippines can help ensure that the most appropriate skills and materials are brought back home. The JUSMAG Philippines has been very involved in the Philippine course selections, and JUSMAGTHAI is becoming more involved in such programming than it has been in the past.

That said, IMET training nonetheless has obvious limitations:

- It helps develop military-to-military relationships, but it does not guarantee U.S. influence.
- It can expose foreign military students to U.S. culture, ideals, and values, but it cannot guarantee that they will choose to—or be able to—reproduce them in their own countries.
- It can improve individuals' military skills, but it cannot guarantee that they will use them appropriately.
- It can provide training materials and experience, but it cannot guarantee that a country will develop an independent training capability.

U.S.-trained military personnel were represented among both the rebel and the loyal troops in the Philippine coup attempts. Despite years of exposure to U.S. democracy, U.S.-trained senior Thai military officers continue to believe that the military must play a central, paternalistic role in democratization. Whereas the Philippine military was once strongly influenced by civilian control of the military in the United States, that influence has waned, despite ongoing IMET training. Exposure to U.S. values and mores has not prevented the Philippine military from perpetrating human-rights abuses. Neither the Philippine nor the Thai armed forces have developed an independent training capability in conventional tactics or techniques, despite 40 years of U.S. training. U.S. relations with the Thai and Philippine military leaderships are cordial and allow for military cooperation in joint exercises, but they do not necessarily translate into political influence.¹

What is true of IMET training in general is equally true of the internal defense and development (IDAD) training provided under IMET. For example, the United States can train foreign militaries in civic action and other internal development skills, but, as in Thailand, such training can be used to enrich the military and extend its control over traditionally civilian enterprises and responsibilities. Or, as in the Philippines, such training can be lost to the military and the country as military technicians retire for higher paying civilian jobs in foreign countries. Nor is U.S. training in IDAD skills a priority for the Thai and Philippine militaries. Provided with limited IMET funds, both the Philippines

¹The benefits and limits of IMET are discussed in Manolas, Spiro C., and Louis J. Samelson, "The United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program: A Report to Congress," *The DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Spring 1990, pp. 4-6.

and Thailand prefer highly technical and/or advanced U.S. training in mostly conventional skills.²

In summary, IMET training is, as the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand pointed out, a means of exposing foreign military students to the United States, thereby providing the United States with improved military-to-military relations and avenues of influence. It is only secondarily an assistance program. Through the IMET program, thousands of U.S.-trained military students have risen to positions of prominence in their own countries: In many cases they have then afforded the United States foreign policy opportunities it may otherwise not have had.³ Furthermore, IMET is a relatively low-budget program: It does not have to have 100 percent success to be successful. Influencing some foreign leaders, having an impact on the training and doctrine of many foreign countries, and maintaining cooperative military-to-military relationships are clear benefits of the program.

Even as a secondary gain, however, the security assistance value of IMET should not be squandered:

- JUSMAG training branch personnel should be adequately trained and prepared for their positions;
- JUSMAGs should be interactively involved in advising their host nations in the course selection process to ensure that the most appropriate courses are taken and that IMET funds are efficiently used;
- JUSMAGs should make a concerted effort to track the careers of U.S.-trained personnel and to maintain contact with such personnel so that the relationships forged during CONUS training are reinforced once students return home;
- the counterproductive use of suspending IMET as a form of sanction should no longer be practiced—it only serves to cut off ties with foreign militaries at a time when relations are more important than ever.

²Clearly, some of the skills are applicable to both IDAD and more conventional military missions, e.g. training in engineering, communications, constabulary, and medical skills. A good deal of training in IDAD is therefore circumstantial rather than intentional. Once they have developed a capability in these skills, countries can put them to use however they choose. Even so, in cases such as the Philippines and Thailand, such training makes up a very small proportion of overall training provided by the United States. One JUSMAG Philippines staff member estimated that such training constitutes 7-10 percent of the total annual IMET training. Even less IDAD training is provided to the Thai military.

³Manolas and Samelson, 1990, Appendix K.

Finally, the IMET-E program should not be implemented half-heartedly. The concept blends the best aspects of IMET's security assistance role with its intent to promote U.S. values and democratization, and has been received favorably by foreign militaries. Both the Thai and the Philippine military, for example, have expressed interest in IMET-E courses. Yet, by requiring IMET-E courses to be funded out of general IMET monies, especially at a time when IMET funds are being reduced in many countries, Congress is further sapping the already-limited IMET funds while at the same time making IMET-E a burden rather than an opportunity for host nations. Given the relatively nominal amount of money that would be required to fully fund both these programs, Congress should reconsider this policy and create a separate source of funding for IMET-E.

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